The fact is deplorable.  It has produced endless friction and has strained the resources of two great Empires; but the allegation of Russian perfidy in the Merv affair may be left to those who look at facts solely from the insular standpoint.  In the eyes of patriotic Russians England was the offender, first by opposing Muscovite policy tooth and nail in the Balkans, secondly by seizing Egypt, and thirdly by refusing to withdraw from that commanding position.  The important fact to notice is that after each of these provocations Russia sought her revenge on that flank of the British Empire to which she was guided by her own sure instincts and by the shrieks of insular Cassandras.  By moving a few sotnias of Cossacks towards Herat she compelled her rival to spend a hundredfold as much in military preparations in India.

It is undeniable that Russia’s persistent breach of her promises in Asiatic affairs exasperated public opinion, and brought the two Empires to the verge of war.  Conduct of that description baffles the resources of diplomacy, which are designed to arrange disputes.  Unfortunately, British foreign affairs were in the hands of Lord Granville, whose gentle reproaches only awakened contempt at St. Petersburg.  The recent withdrawal of Lord Dufferin from St. Petersburg to Constantinople, on the plea of ill-health, was also a misfortune; but his appointment to the Viceroyalty of India (September 1884) placed at Calcutta a Governor-General superior to Lord Ripon in diplomatic experience.

There was every need for the exercise of ability and firmness both at Westminster and Calcutta.  The climax in Russia’s policy of lance-pricks was reached in the following year; and it has been assumed, apparently on good authority, that the understanding arrived at by the three Emperors in their meeting at Skiernewice (September 1884) implied a tacit encouragement of Russia’s designs in Central Asia, however much they were curbed in the Balkan Peninsula.  This was certainly the aim of Bismarck, and that he knew a good deal about Russian movements is clear from his words to Busch on November 24, 1884:  “Just keep a sharp look-out on the news from Afghanistan.  Something will happen there soon[340].”

[Footnote 340:  Bismarck:  Some Secret Pages of his History, vol. iii. pp. 124, 133 (Eng. ed.).]

This was clearly more than a surmise.  At that time an Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was appointed to settle the many vexed questions concerning the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan boundary.  General Sir Peter Lumsden proceeded to Sarrakhs, expecting there to meet the Russian Commissioners by appointment in the middle of October 1884.  On various pretexts the work of the Commission was postponed in accordance with advices sent from St. Petersburg.  The aim of this dilatory policy soon became evident.  That was the time when (as will appear in Chapter XVI.) the British expedition was slowly working its way towards