The accession of Alexander III., after the murder of his father on March 13, 1881, promised for a short time to usher in a more peaceful policy; but, in truth, the last important diplomatic assurance of the reign of Alexander II. was that given by the Minister M. de Giers, to Lord Dufferin, as to Russia’s resolve not to occupy Merv.  “Not only do we not want to go there, but, happily, there is nothing which can require us to go there.”

In spite of a similar assurance given on April 5 to the Russian ambassador in London, both the need and the desire soon sprang into existence.  Muscovite agents made their way to the fruitful oasis of Merv; and a daring soldier, Alikhanoff, in the guise of a merchant’s clerk, proceeded thither early in 1882, skilfully distributed money to work up a Russian party, and secretly sketched a plan of the fortress.  Many chiefs and traders opposed Russia bitterly, for our brilliant and adventurous countryman, O’Donovan, while captive there, sought to open their eyes to the coming danger.  But England’s influence had fallen to zero since Skobeleff’s victory and her own withdrawal from Candahar[337].

[Footnote 337:  C. Marvin, Merv, the Queen of the World (1881); E. O’Donovan, The Merv Oasis, 2 vols. (1882-83), and Merv (1883).]

In 1882 a Russian Engineer officer, Lessar, in the guise of a scientific explorer, surveyed the route between Merv and Herat, and found that it presented far fewer difficulties than had been formerly reported to exist[338].  Finally, in 1884, the Czar’s Government sought to revenge itself for Britain’s continued occupation of Egypt by fomenting trouble near the Afghan border.  Alikhanoff then reappeared, not in disguise, browbeat the hostile chieftains at Merv by threats of a Russian invasion, and finally induced them to take an oath of allegiance to Alexander III. (Feb. 12, 1884)[339].

[Footnote 338:  See his reports in Parl.  Papers, Central Asia, No. 1 (1884), pp. 26, 36, 39, 63, 96, 106.]

[Footnote 339:  Ibid. p. 119.]

There was, however, some reason for Russia’s violation of her repeated promises respecting Merv.  In practical politics the theory of compensation has long gained an assured footing; and, seeing that Britain had occupied Egypt partly as the mandatory of Europe, and now refused to evacuate that land, the Russian Government had a good excuse for retaliation.  As has happened at every time of tension between the two Empires since 1855, the Czar chose to embarrass the Island Power by pushing on towards India.  As a matter of fact, the greater the pressure that Russia brought to bear on the Afghan frontier, the greater became the determination of England not to withdraw from Egypt.  Hence, in the years 1882-4, both Powers plunged more deeply into that “vicious circle” in which the policy of the Crimean War had enclosed them, and from which they have never freed themselves.