On one point both parties were agreed.  Events had shown how undesirable it was to hold Cabul and Central Afghanistan.  The evacuation of all these districts was specified in Lord Lytton’s last official Memorandum, that which he signed on June 7, 1880, as certain to take place as soon as the political arrangements at Cabul were duly settled.  The retiring Viceroy, however, declared that in his judgment the whole Province of Candahar must be severed from the Cabul Power, whether Abdur Rahman assented to it or not[328].  Obviously this implied the subjection of Candahar to British rule in some form.  General Roberts himself argued stoutly for the retention of that city and district; and so did most of the military men.  Lord Wolseley, on the other hand, urged that it would place an undesirable strain upon the resources of India, and that the city could readily be occupied from the Quetta position, if ever the Russians advanced to Herat.  The Cabinet strongly held this opinion.  The exponents of Whig ideas, Lord Hartington and the Duke of Argyll, herein agreeing with the exponents of a peaceful un-Imperial commercialism, Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain.  Consequently the last of the British troops were withdrawn from Candahar on April 15, 1881.

[Footnote 328:  Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 430, 445.  On June 8 Lord Ripon arrived at Simla and took over the Viceroyalty from Lord Lytton; the latter was raised to an earldom.]

The retirement was more serious in appearance than in reality.  The war had brought some substantial gains.  The new frontier acquired by the Treaty of Gandamak—­and the terms of that compact were practically void until Roberts’ victory at Candahar gave them body and life—­provided ample means for sending troops easily to the neighbourhood of Cabul, Ghazni, and Candahar; and experience showed that troops kept in the hill stations on the frontier preserved their mettle far better than those cantoned in or near the unhealthy cities just named.  The Afghans had also learnt a sharp lesson of the danger and futility of leaning on Russia; and to this fact must be attributed the steady adherence of the new Ameer to the British side.

Moreover, the success of his rule depended largely on our evacuation of his land.  Experience has shown that a practically independent and united Afghanistan forms a better barrier to a Russian advance than an Afghanistan rent by the fanatical feuds that spring up during a foreign occupation.  Finally, the great need of India after the long famine was economy.  A prosperous and contented India might be trusted to beat off any army that Russia could send; a bankrupt India would be the breeding-ground of strife and mutiny; and on these fell powers Skobeleff counted as his most formidable allies[329].

[Footnote 329:  See Appendix; also Lord Hartington’s speeches in the House of Commons, March 25-6, 1881]