The British commander counted on exploiting these peculiarities to the full by stalking the enemy on their left flank, while he left about 1000 men to attack them once more in front.  Setting out at nightfall of December 1, he led the remainder northwards through a side valley, and then up a gully on the side of the Spingawi.  The ascent through pine woods and rocks, in the teeth of an icy wind, was most trying; and the movement came near to failure owing to the treachery of two Pathan soldiers in the ranks, who fired off their rifles in the hope of warning the Afghans above them.  The reports, it afterwards transpired, were heard by a sentry, who reported the matter to the commander of the Afghan detachment; he, for his part, did nothing.  Much alarm was felt in the British column when the shots rang out in the darkness; a native officer hard by came up at once, and, by smelling the rifles of all his men, found out the offenders; but as they were Mohammedans, he said nothing, in the hope of screening his co-religionists.  Later on, these facts transpired at a court-martial, whereupon the elder of the two offenders, who was also the first to fire, was condemned to death, and the younger to a long term of imprisonment.  The defaulting officer likewise received due punishment[312].

[Footnote 312:  Lord Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, vol. ii. p. 130 et seq.; Major J.A.S.  Colquhoun, With the Kurram Field Force, 1878-79, pp. 101-102.]

After this alarming incident, the 72nd Highlanders were sent forward to take the place of the native regiment previously leading; and once more the little column struggled on through the darkness up the rocky path.  Their staunchness met its reward.  At dawn the Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas charged the Afghan detachment in its entrenchments and breastworks of trees, and were soon masters of the Spingawi position.  A long and anxious time of waiting now ensued, caused by the failure of the first frontal attack on the Kotal; but Roberts’ pressure on the flank of the main Afghan position and another frontal attack sent the enemy flying in utter rout, leaving behind guns and waggons.  The Kurram column had driven eight Afghan regiments and numbers of hillmen from a seemingly impregnable position, and now held the second of the outer passes leading towards Cabul (December 2, 1878).  The Afghans offered but slight resistance at the Shutargardan Pass further on, and from that point the invaders looked down on valleys that conducted them easily to the Ameer’s capital[313].

[Footnote 313:  Lord Roberts, op. cit., vol. ii. pp. 135-149; S.H.  Shadbolt, The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80, vol. i. pp. 21-25 (with plan).]

Meanwhile equal success was attending the 3rd British column, that of General Biddulph, which operated from Quetta.  It occupied Sibi and the Khojak Pass; and on January 8, 1879, General Stewart and the vanguard reached Candahar, which they entered in triumph.  The people seemed to regard their entry with indifference.  This was but natural.  Shere Ali had ruined his own cause.  Hearing of the first defeats he fled from Cabul in company with the remaining members of the Russian Mission still at that city (December 13), and made for Afghan Turkestan in the hope of inducing his northern allies to give active aid.