[Footnote 304:  Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 255.  For a defence of this on military grounds see Lord Roberts’ Forty-One Years in India, vol. ii, p. 187; and Thorburn’s Asiatic Neighbours, chap. xiv.]

But by this time all hope of peace had become precarious.  On June 13, the day of opening of the Congress of Berlin, a Russian Mission, under General Stolieteff, left Samarcand for Cabul.  The Ameer is said to have heard this news with deep concern, and to have sought to prevent it crossing the frontier.  The Russians, however, refused to turn back, and entered Cabul on July 22[305].  As will be seen by reference to Skobeleff’s “Plan for the Invasion of India” (Appendix II.), the Mission was to be backed up by columns of troops; and, with the aim of redoubling the pressure of Russian diplomacy in Europe, the Minister for War at St. Petersburg had issued orders on April 25, 1878, for the despatch of three columns of troops which were to make a demonstration against India.  The chief force, 12,000 strong, with 44 guns and a rocket battery, was to march from Samarcand and Tashkend on Cabul; the second, consisting of only 1700 men, was to stir up the mountain tribes of the Chitral district to raid the north of the Punjab; while the third, of the same strength, moved from the middle part of the Amu Daria (Oxus) towards Merv and Herat.  The main force set out from Tashkend on June 13, and after a most trying march reached the Russo-Bokharan border, only to find that its toils were fruitless owing to the signature of the Treaty of Berlin (July 13).  The same disappointing news dispelled the dreams of conquest which had nerved the other columns in their burning march.

[Footnote 305:  Parl Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), pp.242-243; ibid. Central Asia, No. 1, pp.165 et seq.]

Thus ended the scheme of invasion of India to which Skobeleff had lately given shape and body.  In January 1877, while in his Central Asian command, he had drawn up a detailed plan, the important parts of which will be found in the Appendices of this volume.  During the early spring of 1878, when the Russian army lay at San Stefano, near Constantinople, he drew up another plan of the same tenour.  It seems certain that the general outline of these projects haunted the minds of officers and men in the expeditions just referred to; for the columns withdrew northwards most slowly and reluctantly[306].

[Footnote 306:  For details see Russia’s Advance towards India, by “an Indian Officer,” vol. ii. pp.109 et seq.]

A perusal of Skobeleff’s plan will show that he relied also on a diplomatic Mission to Cabul and on the despatch of the Afghan pretender, Abdur Rahman, from Samarcand to the Afghan frontier.  Both of these expedients were adopted in turn; the former achieved a startling but temporary success.