As for the mountain barrier, in which men of the Lawrence school had been wont to trust, he termed it “a military mouse-trap,” and he stated that Napoleon I. had once for all shown the futility of relying on a mountain range that had several passes[302].  These assertions show what perhaps were the weak points of Lord Lytton in practical politics—­an eager and impetuous disposition, too prone to be dazzled by the very brilliance of the phrases which he coined.

[Footnote 302:  Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp.166-185, 247-148.]

At the close of his despatch of April 8, 1878, to Lord Cranbrook (Lord Salisbury’s successor at the India Office) he sketched out, as “the best arrangement,” a scheme for breaking up the Cabul power and bringing about “the creation of a West Afghan Khanate, including Merv, Maimena, Balkh, Candahar, and Herat, under some prince of our own selection, who would be dependent on our support.  With Western Afghanistan thus disposed of, and a small station our own, close to our frontier in the Kurram valley, the destinies of Cabul itself would be to us a matter of no importance[303].”

[Footnote 303:  Ibid. pp. 246-247.]

This, then, was the new policy in its widest scope.  Naturally it met with sharp opposition from Lord Lawrence and others in the India Council at Whitehall.  Besides involving a complete change of front, it would naturally lead to war with the Ameer, and (if the intentions about Merv were persisted in) with Russia as well.  And for what purpose?  In order that we might gain an advanced frontier and break in pieces the one important State which remained as a buffer between India and Russian Asia.  In the eyes of all but the military men this policy stood self-condemned.  Its opponents pointed out that doubtless Russian intrigues were going on at Cabul; but they were the result of the marked hostility between England and Russia in Europe, and a natural retort to the sending of Indian troops to Malta.  Besides, was it true that British influence at Cabul was permanently lost?  Might it not be restored by money and diplomacy?  Or if these means failed, could not affairs be so worked at Cabul as to bring about the deposition of the Ameer in favour of some claimant who would support England?  In any case, the extension of our responsibilities to centres so remote as Balkh and Herat would overstrain the already burdened finances of India, and impair her power of defence at vital points.

These objections seem to have had some weight at Whitehall, for by the month of August the Viceroy somewhat lowered his tone; he gave up all hope of influencing Merv, and consented to make another effort to win back the Ameer, or to seek to replace him by a more tractable prince.  But, failing this, he advised, though with reluctance on political grounds, the conquest and occupation of so much of Afghan territory as would “be absolutely requisite for the permanent maintenance of our North-West frontier[304].”