In fact, all who are familiar with the events preceding the first Afghan War (1839-42) can now see that events were fast drifting into a position dangerously like that which led Dost Mohammed to throw himself into the arms of Russia.  At that time also the Afghan ruler had sought to gain the best possible terms for himself and his dynasty from the two rivals; and, finding that the Russian promises were far more alluring than those emanating from Calcutta, he went over to the Muscovites.  At bottom that had been the determining cause of the first Afghan War; and affairs were once more beginning to revolve in the same vicious circle.  Looking back on the events leading up to the second Afghan War, we can now see that a frank compliance with the demands of Shere Ali would have been far less costly than the non-committal policy which in 1873 alienated him.  Outwardly he posed as the aggrieved but still faithful friend.  In reality he was looking northwards for the personal guarantee which never came from Calcutta.

It should, however, be stated that up to the time of the fall of the Gladstone Ministry (February 1874), Russia seemed to have no desire to meddle in Afghan affairs.  The Russian Note of January 21, 1874, stated that the Imperial Government “continued to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action[294].”  Nevertheless, that declaration inspired little confidence.  The Russophobes, headed by Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere, could reply that they distrusted Russian disclaimers concerning Afghanistan, when the plea of necessity had so frequently and so speedily relegated to oblivion the earlier “assurances of intention.”

[Footnote 294:  Argyll, Eastern Question, vol. ii. p. 347.  See, however, the letters that passed between General Kaufmann, Governor of Turkestan, and Cabul in 1870-74, in Parl.  Papers, Central Asia, No. 1 (1881), pp. 2-10.]

Such was the state of affairs when, in February 1874, Disraeli came to power at Westminster with Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for India.  The new Ministry soon showed the desire to adopt a more spirited foreign policy than their predecessors, who had fretted public opinion by their numerous acts of complaisance or surrender.  Russia soon gave cause for complaint.  In June 1874 the Governor of the trans-Caspian province issued a circular, warning the nomad Turkomans of the Persian border-lands against raiding; it applied to tribes inhabiting districts within what were considered to be the northern boundaries of Persia.  This seemed to contravene the assurances previously given by Russia that she would not extend her possessions in the southern part of Central Asia[295].  It also foreshadowed another stride forward at the expense of the Turkoman districts both of Persia and Afghanistan.

[Footnote 295:  Parl.  Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), p. 107.]