The time seemed to favour his design.  Apart from the Persian boundary questions (which were settled in a manner displeasing to the Ameer), trouble loomed ahead in Central Asia.  The Russians were advancing on Khiva; and the Afghan statesman, during his stay at Simla, sought to intimidate Lord Northbrook by parading this fact.  He pointed out that Russia would easily conquer Khiva and then would capture Merv, near the western frontier of Afghanistan, “either in the current year or the next.”  Equally obvious was his aim in insisting that “the interests of the Afghan and English Governments are identical,” and that “the border of Afghanistan is in truth the border of India.”  These were ingenious ways of working his intrenchments up to the hitherto inaccessible citadel of Indian border policy.  The news of the Russian advance on Khiva lent strength to his argument.

[Illustration:  AFGHANISTAN]

Yet, when he came to the question of the guarantee of Shere Ali’s dynasty, he again met with a rebuff.  In truth, Lord Northbrook and his advisers saw that the Ameer was seeking to frighten them about Russia in order to improve his own family prospects in Afghanistan; and, paying too much attention, perhaps, to the oriental artfulness of the method of request, and too little to the importance of the questions then at stake, he decided to meet the Ameer in regard to non-essentials, though he failed to satisfy him on the one thing held to be needful at the palace of Cabul.

Anxious, however, to consult the Home Government on a matter of such importance, now that the Russians were known to be at Khiva, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Duke of Argyll on July 24, 1873:—­

Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know how far he may rely on our help if invaded.  I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked aggression.  We to be the judge of the necessity.  Answer by telegraph quickly.

The Gladstone Ministry was here at the parting of the ways.  The Ameer asked them to form an alliance on equal terms.  They refused, believing, as it seems, that they could keep to the old one-sided arrangement of 1855, whereby the Ameer promised effective help to the Indian Government, if need be, and gained only friendly assurance in return.  The Duke of Argyll telegraphed in reply on July 26:—­

Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if he abides by our advice in external affairs[290].

[Footnote 290:  Argyll, op. cit. vol. ii. 331.  The Gladstone Cabinet clearly weakened Lord Northbrook’s original proposal, and must therefore bear a large share of responsibility for the alienation of the Ameer which soon ensued.  The Duke succeeded in showing up many inaccuracies in the versions of these events afterwards given by Lord Lytton and Lord Cranbrook; but he was seemingly quite unconscious of the consequences resulting from adherence to an outworn theory.]