Apparently, then, there was a fair chance of arriving at an agreement with the Ameer.  But the understanding broke down on the question of the amount of support to be accorded to Shere Ali’s dynasty.  That ruler wished for an important modification of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1855, which had bound his father to close friendship with the old Company without binding the Company to intervene in his favour.  That, said Shere Ali, was a “dry friendship.”  He wanted a friendship more fruitful than that of the years 1863-67, and a direct support to his dynasty whenever he claimed it.  The utmost concession that Lord Mayo would grant was that the British Government would “view with severe displeasure any attempt to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil war[288].”

[Footnote 288:  Argyll, op. cit. vol. ii. p. 263.]

It seems that Shere Ali thought lightly of Britain’s “displeasure,” for he departed ill at ease.  Not even the occasional presents of money and weapons that found their way from Calcutta to Cabul could thenceforth keep his thoughts from turning northwards towards Russia.  At Umballa he had said little about that Power; and the Viceroy had very wisely repressed any feelings of anxiety that he may have had on that score.  Possibly the strength and cheeriness of Lord Mayo’s personality would have helped to assuage the Ameer’s wounded feelings; but that genial Irishman fell under the dagger of a fanatic during a tour in the Andaman Islands (February 1872).  His death was a serious event.  Shere Ali cherished towards him feelings which he did not extend to his successor, Lord Northbrook (1872-76).

Yet, during that vice-royalty, the diplomatic action of Great Britain secured for the Ameer the recognition of his claims over the northern part of Afghanistan, as far as the banks of the Upper Oxus.  In the years 1870-72 Russia stoutly contested those claims, but finally withdrew them, the Emperor declaring at the close of the latter year “that such a question should not be a cause of difference between the two countries, and he was determined it should not be so.”  It is further noteworthy that Russian official communications more than once referred to the Ameer of Afghanistan as being “under the protection of the Indian Government[289]”.

[Footnote 289:  Argyll, op. cit. vol. ii. pp. 289, 292.  For the Czar’s assurance that “extension of territory” was “extension of weakness,” see Parl.  Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), p. 101.]

These signal services of British diplomacy counted for little at Cabul in comparison with the question of the dynastic guarantee which we persistently withheld.  In the spring of 1873, when matters relating to the Afghan-Persian frontier had to be adjusted, the Ameer sent his Prime Minister to Simla with the intention of using every diplomatic means for the extortion of that long-delayed boon.