The Afghans did not appreciate it.  Shere All protested that it placed a premium on revolt; he also complained that the Viceroy not only gave him no help, but even recognised his rival, Ufzul, when the latter captured Cabul.  After the death of Ufzul and the assumption of authority at Cabul by a third brother, Azam, Shere Ali by a sudden and desperate attempt drove his rival from Cabul (September 8, 1868) and practically ended the schisms and strifes which for five years had rent Afghanistan in twain.  Then, but then only, did Lord Lawrence consent to recognise him as Ameer of the whole land, and furnish him with L60,000 and a supply of arms.  An act which, five years before, would probably have ensured the speedy triumph of Shere Ali and his lasting gratitude to Great Britain, now laid him under no sense of obligation[284].  He might have replied to Lord Lawrence with the ironical question with which Dr. Johnson declined Lord Chesterfield’s belated offer of patronage:  “Is not a patron, my lord, one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, and, when he has reached ground, encumbers him with help?”

[Footnote 284:  The late Duke of Argyll in his Eastern Question (vol. ii. p. 42) cited the fact of this offer of money and arms as a proof that Lord Lawrence was not wedded to the theory of “masterly inactivity,” and stated that the gift helped Shere Ali to complete his success.  It is clear, however, that Lord Lawrence waited to see whether that success was well assured before the offer was made.

The Duke of Argyll proves one thing, that the action of Lord Lawrence in September 1868 was not due to Sir Henry Rawlinson’s despatch from London (dated July 20, 1868) in favour of more vigorous action.  It was due to Lawrence’s perception of the change brought about by Russian action in the Khanate of Bokhara, near the Afghan border.]

Moreover, there is every reason to think that Shere Ali, with the proneness of orientals to refer all actions to the most elemental motives, attributed the change of front at Calcutta solely to fear.  That was the time when the Russian capture of Samarcand cowed the Khan of Bokhara and sent a thrill through Central Asia.  In the political psychology of the Afghans, the tardy arrival at Cabul of presents from India argued little friendship for Shere Ali, but great dread of the conquering Muscovites.

Such, then, was the policy of “masterly inactivity” in 1863-68, cheap for India, but excessively costly for Afghanistan.  Lord Lawrence rendered incalculable services to India before and during the course of the Mutiny, but his conduct towards Shere Ali is certainly open to criticism.  The late Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India in the Gladstone Ministry (1868-74), supported it in his work, The Eastern Question, on the ground that the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1855 pledged the British not to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan[285].  But uncalled for interference is one thing; to refuse even a slight measure of help to an ally, who begs it as a return for most valuable services, is quite another thing.