[Footnote 281:  Sir J.W.  Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan, 5 vols. (1851-78).]

To his surprise and disgust he met with no return whatever, even in a matter which most nearly concerned his dynasty and the future of Afghanistan.  As generally happens with Moslem rulers, the aged Ameer occupied his declining days with seeking to provide against the troubles that naturally resulted from the oriental profusion of his marriages.  Dost Mohammed’s quiver was blessed with the patriarchal equipment of sixteen sons—­most of them stalwart, warlike, and ambitious.  Eleven of them limited their desires to parts of Afghanistan, but five of them aspired to rule over all the tribes that go to make up that seething medley.  Of these, Shere Ali was the third in age but the first in capacity, if not in prowess.  Moreover, he was the favourite son of Dost Mohammed; but where rival mothers and rival tribes were concerned, none could foresee the issue of the pending conflict[282].

[Footnote 282:  G.B.  Malleson, History of Afghanistan, p. 421.]

Dost Mohammed sought to avert it by gaining the effective support of the Indian Government for his Benjamin.  He pleaded in vain.  Lord Canning, Governor-General of India at the time of the Mutiny, recognised Shere Ali as heir-apparent, but declined to give any promise of support either in arms or money.  Even after the Mutiny was crushed, Lord Canning and his successor, Lord Elgin, adhered to the former decision, refusing even a grant of money and rifles for which father and son pleaded.

As we have said, Dost Mohammed died in 1863; but even when Shere Ali was face to face with formidable family schisms and a widespread revolt, Lord Lawrence clung to the policy of recognising only “de facto Powers,” that is, Powers which actually existed and could assert their authority.  All that he offered was to receive Shere Ali in conference, and give him good advice; but he would only recognise him as Ameer of Afghanistan if he could prevail over his brothers and their tribesmen.  He summed it up in this official letter of April 17, 1866, sent to the Governor of the Punjab:—­

It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not interfere in the struggle, that we will not aid either party, that we will leave the Afghans to settle their own quarrels, and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and good-will with the nation and with their rulers de facto.  Suitable opportunities can be taken to declare that these are the principles which will guide our policy; and it is the belief of the Governor-General that such a policy will in the end be appreciated[283].

[Footnote 283:  Parl.  Papers, Afghanistan, No. 1 (1878), p. 10.  For a defence of this policy of “masterly inactivity,” see Mr. Bosworth Smith’s Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. ii. pp. 570-590; also Mr. J.W.S.  Wyllie’s Essays on the External Policy of India.]