[Footnote 280:  For an account of Samarcand and Bokhara, see Russia in Central Asia, by Hon. G. (Lord) Curzon (1889); A. Vambery’s Travels in Central Asia (1867-68); Rev. H. Lansdell, Russian Central Asia, 2 vols. (1885); E. Schuyler, Journey in Russian Turkestan, etc., 2 vols. (1876); E. O’Donovan, The Merv Oasis, 2 vols. (1883).]

It is believed that the annexation of Samarcand was contrary to the intentions of the Czar.  Alexander II. was a friend of peace; and he had no desire to push forward his frontiers to the verge of Afghanistan, where friction would probably ensue with the British Government.  Already he had sought to allay the irritation prevalent in Russophobe circles in England.  In November 1864, his Chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, issued a circular setting forth the causes that impelled the Russians on their forward march.  It was impossible, he said, to keep peace with uncivilised and predatory tribes on their frontiers.  Russia must press on until she came into touch with a State whose authority would guarantee order on the boundaries.  The argument was a strong one; and it may readily be granted that good government, civilisation, and commerce have benefited by the extension of the pax Russica over the slave-hunting Turkomans and the inert tribes of Siberia.

Nevertheless, as Gortchakoff’s circular expressed the intention of refraining from conquest for the sake of conquest, the irritation in England became very great when the conquest of Tashkend, and thereafter of Samarcand, was ascribed, apparently on good grounds, to the ambition of the Russian commanders, Tchernaieff and Kaufmann respectively.  On the news of the capture of Samarcand reaching London, the Russian ambassador hastened to assure the British Cabinet that his master did not intend to retain his conquest.  Nevertheless, it was retained.  The doctrine of political necessity proved to be as expansive as Russia’s boundaries; and, after the rapid growth of the Indian Empire under Lord Dalhousie, the British Government could not deny the force of the plea.

This mighty stride forward brought Russia to the northern bounds of Afghanistan, a land which was thenceforth to be the central knot of diplomatic problems of vast magnitude.  It will therefore be well, in beginning our survey of a question which was to test the efficacy of autocracy and democracy in international affairs, to gain some notion of the physical and political conditions of the life of that people.

As generally happens in a mountainous region in the midst of a great continent, their country exhibits various strata of conquest and settlement.  The northern district, sloping towards Turkestan, is inhabited mainly by Turkomans who have not yet given up their roving habits.  The rugged hill country bordering on the Punjab is held by Pathans and Ghilzais, who are said by some to be of the same stock as the Afghans.  On the other hand, a well-marked local legend identifies the Afghans proper with the lost ten tribes of Israel; and those who love to speculate on that elusive and delusive subject may long use their ingenuity in speculating whether the oft-quoted text as to the chosen people possessing the gates of their enemies is more applicable to the sea-faring and sea-holding Anglo-Saxons or to the pass-holding Afghans.