+-------------------------------+------------+---------

-+----------+
|                               |Men.        |Horses.   |Cannon.   |
|North                          |377,000     |48,000    |1284      |
|South                          |97,000      |10,000    |288       |
+-------------------------------+------------+----------+---

-------+

but the support of the latter might be hoped for.  Lebrun again urged the desirability of a campaign in the autumn, but the Archduke repeated that it must begin in the spring.  In that condition, as in his earlier statement that France must declare war first, while her allies prepared for war, we may discern a deep-rooted distrust of Napoleon III.

On June 14 the Archduke introduced Lebrun to the Emperor Francis Joseph, who informed him that he wanted peace; but, he added, “if I make war, I must be forced to it.”  In case of war Prussia might exploit the national German sentiment existing in South Germany and Austria.  He concluded with these words, “But if the Emperor Napoleon, compelled to accept or to declare war, came with his armies into South Germany, not as an enemy but as a liberator, I should be forced on my side to declare that I [would] make common cause with him.  In the eyes of my people I could do no other than join my armies to those of France.  That is what I pray you to say for me to the Emperor Napoleon; I hope that he will see, as I do, my situation both in home and foreign affairs.”  Such was the report which Lebrun drew up for Napoleon III. on June 30.  It certainly led that sovereign to believe in the probability of Austrian help in the spring of 1871, but not before that time.

The question now arises whether Bismarck was aware of these proposals.  If warlike counsels prevailed at Vienna, it is probable that some preparations would be made, and the secret may have leaked out in this way, or possibly through the Hungarian administration.  In any case, Bismarck knew that the Austrian chancellor, Count Beust, thirsted for revenge for the events of 1866[16].  If he heard any whispers of an approaching league against Prussia, he would naturally see the advantage of pressing on war at once, before Austria and Italy were ready to enter the lists.  Probably in this fact will be found one explanation of the origin of the Franco-German War.

[Footnote 16:  Bismarck:  his Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii. p. 58.]

Before adverting to the proximate cause of the rupture, we may note that Beust’s despatch of July 11, 1870, to Prince Metternich, Austrian ambassador at Paris, displayed genuine fear lest France should rush blindly into war with Prussia; and he charged Metternich tactfully to warn the French Government against such a course of action, which would “be contrary to all that we have agreed upon. . . .  Even if we wished, we could not suddenly equip a respectably large force. . . .  Our services are gained to a certain extent [by France]; but we shall not go further unless events carry us on; and we do not dream of plunging into war because it might suit France to do so.”