East; but old-fashioned Russians have always deplored entanglement in European affairs, and have pointed to the more hopeful Orient.  Even during the pursuit of Napoleon’s shattered forces in their retreat from Moscow in 1812, the Russian Commander, Kutusoff, told Sir Robert Wilson that Napoleon’s overthrow would benefit, not the world at large, but only England[272].  He failed to do his utmost, largely because he looked forward to peace with France and a renewal of the Russian advance on India.

[Footnote 272:  The French Invasion of Russia, by Sir R. Wilson, p. 234.]

The belief that England was the enemy came to be increasingly held by leading Russians, especially, of course, after the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress.  Russia’s true mission, they said, lay in Asia.  There, among those ill-compacted races, she could easily build up an Empire that never could be firmly founded on tough, recalcitrant Bulgars or warlike Turks.  The Triple Alliance having closed the door to Russia on the West, there was the greater temptation to take the other alternative course—­that line of least resistance which led towards Afghanistan and Manchuria.  The value of an understanding with France was now clear to all.  As we have seen, it guarded Russia’s exposed frontier in Poland, and poured into the exchequer treasures which speedily took visible form in the Siberian railway, as well as the extensions of the lines leading to Merv and Tashkend.

But this eastern trend of Russian policy can scarcely be called peaceful.  The Panjdeh incident (March 29, 1885) would have led any other Government than that of Mr. Gladstone to declare war on the aggressor.  Events soon turned the gaze of the Russians towards Manchuria, and the Franco-Russian agreement enabled them to throw their undivided energies in that direction (see Chapter XX.).  It was French money which enabled Russia to dominate Manchuria, and, for the time, to overawe Japan.  In short, the Dual Alliance peacefully conducted the Muscovites to Port Arthur.

* * * * *

The death of Alexander III. in November 1894 brought to power a very different personality, kindlier and more generous, but lacking the strength and prudence of the deceased ruler.  Nicholas II. had none of that dislike of Western institutions which haunted his father.  The way was therefore open for a more binding compact with France, the need for which was emphasised by the events of the years 1894-95 in the Far East.  But the manner in which it came about is still but dimly known.  Members of the House of Orleans are said to have taken part in the overtures, perhaps with the view of helping on the hypnotising influence which alliance with the autocracy of the East exerts on the democracy of the West.