Rumours of war were widespread in the year 1891.  Wild tales were told as to a secret treaty between Germany and Belgium for procuring a passage to the Teutonic hosts through that neutralised kingdom, and thus turning the new eastern fortresses which France had constructed at enormous cost[269].  Parts of Northern France were to be the reward of King Leopold’s complaisance, and the help of England and Turkey was to be secured by substantial bribes[270].  The whole scheme wears a look of amateurish grandiosity; but, on the principle that there is no smoke without fire (which does not always hold good for diplomatic smoke), much alarm was felt at Paris.  The renewal of the Triple Alliance in June 1891, for a term of six years, was followed up a month later by a visit of the Emperor William to England, during which he took occasion at the Guildhall to state his desire “to maintain the historical friendship between these our two nations” (July 10).  Balanced though this assertion was by an expression of a hope in the peaceful progress of all peoples, the words sent an imaginative thrill to the banks of the Seine and the Neva.

[Footnote 269:  In the French Chamber of Deputies it was officially stated in 1893, that in two decades France had spent the sum of L614,000,000 on her army and the new fortresses, apart from that on strategic railways and the fleet.]

[Footnote 270:  Notovich, L’Empereur Alexandre III. ch. viii.]

The outcome of it all was the visit of the French Channel Fleet to Cronstadt at the close of July; and the French statesman M. Flourens asserts that the Czar himself took the initiative in this matter[271].  The fleet received an effusive welcome, and, to the surprise of all Europe, the Emperor visited the flagship of Admiral Gervais and remained uncovered while the band played the national airs of the two nations.  Few persons ever expected the autocrat of the East to pay that tribute to the Marseillaise.  But, in truth, French democracy was then entering on a new phase at home.  Politicians of many shades of opinion had begun to cloak themselves with “opportunism”—­a conveniently vague term, first employed by Gambetta, but finally used to designate any serviceable compromise between parliamentary rule, autocracy, and flamboyant militarism.  The Cronstadt fetes helped on the warping process.

[Footnote 271:  L.E.  Flourens, Alexandre III.:  sa Vie, son Oeuvre, p. 319.]

Whether any definite compact was there signed is open to doubt.  The Times correspondent, writing on July 31 from St. Petersburg, stated that Admiral Gervais had brought with him from Paris a draft of a convention, which was to be considered and thereafter signed by the Russian Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and the Navy, but not by the Czar himself until the need for it arose.  Probably, then, no alliance was formed, but military and naval conventions were drawn up to serve as bases for common action if an emergency should arise.  These agreements were elaborated in conferences held by the Russian generals, Vanoffski and Obrucheff, with the French generals, Saussier, Miribel, and Boisdeffre.  A Russian loan was soon afterwards floated at Paris amidst great enthusiasm.