Now was the opportunity for which the French houses had been waiting and working.  In October 1888, Hoskier received an invitation to repair to St. Petersburg secretly, in order to consider the taking up of a loan of 500,000,000 francs at 4 per cent, to replace war loans contracted in 1877 at 5 per cent.  At once he assured the Russian authorities that his syndicate would accept the offer, and though the German financiers raged and plotted against him, the loan went to Paris.  This was the beginning of a series of loans launched by Russia at Paris, and so successfully that by the year 1894 as much as four milliards of francs (L160,000,000) is said to have been subscribed in that way[267].  Thus the wealth of France enabled Russia to consolidate her debt on easier terms, to undertake strategic railways, to build a new navy, and arm her immense forces with new and improved weapons.  It is well known that Russia could not otherwise have ventured on these and other costly enterprises; and one cannot but admire the skill which she showed in making so timely a use of Gallic enthusiasm, as well as the statesmanlike foresight of the French in piling up these armaments on the weakest flank of Germany.

[Footnote 267:  E. Daudet, Histoire diplomatique de l’Alliance franco-russe, pp. 270-279.]

Meanwhile the Boulangist bubble had burst.  After his removal from the army on the score of insubordination, “le brav’ general” entered into politics, and, to the surprise of all, gained an enormous majority in the election for a district of Paris (January 1889).  It is believed that, had he rallied his supporters and marched against the Elysee, he might have overthrown the parliamentary Republic.  But, like Robespierre at the crisis of his career, he did not strike—­he discoursed of reason and moderation.  For once the authorities took the initiative; and when the new Premier, Tirard, took action against him for treason, he fled to Brussels on the appropriate date of the 1st of April.  Thenceforth, the Royalist-Bonapartist-Radical hybrid, known as Boulangism, ceased to scare the world; and its challenging snorts died away in sounds which were finally recognised as convulsive brayings.  How far the Slavophils of Russia had a hand in goading on the creature is not known.  Elie de Cyon, writing at a later date, declared that he all along saw through and distrusted Boulanger.  Disclaimers of this kind were plentiful in the following years[268].

[Footnote 268:  De Cyon, op. cit. pp. 394 et seq.]

After the exposure of that hero of the Boulevards, it was natural that the Czar should decline to make a binding compact with France; and he signalised the isolation of Russia by proposing a toast to the Prince of Montenegro as “the only sincere and faithful friend of Russia.”  Nevertheless, the dismissal of Bismarck by William II., in March 1890, brought about a time of strain and friction between Russia and Germany which furthered the prospects of a Franco-Russian entente.  Thenceforth peace depended on the will of a young autocrat who now and again gave the impression that he was about to draw the sword for the satisfaction of his ancestral manes.  A sharp and long-continued tariff war between Germany and Russia also embittered the relations between the two Powers.