Next to nothing, then, is known on the interesting question how far the British Government went in framing an agreement with Italy, and through her, with the Triple Alliance.  We can only conjecture the motives which induced the Salisbury Cabinet to make a strategic turn towards that “conservative” alliance, and yet not definitely join it.  The isolation of England proved, in the sequel, to be not only a source of annoyance to the Continental Powers but of weakness to herself, because her statesmen failed to use to the full the potential advantages of their position at the middle of the see-saw.  Bismarck’s dislike of England was not incurable; he was never a thorough-going “colonial”; and it is probable that the adhesion of England to his league would have inaugurated a period of mutual good-will in politics, colonial policy, and commerce.  The abstention of England has in the sequel led German statesmen to show all possible deference to Russia, generally at the expense of British interests.

The importance of this consideration becomes obvious when the dangers of the year 1887 are remembered.  The excitement caused in Russia and France by the Rustchuk and Schnaebele affairs, the tension in Germany produced by the drastic proposals of a new Army Bill, and, above all, the prospect of the triumph of Boulangist militarism in France, kept the Continent in a state of tension for many months.  In May, Katkoff nearly succeeded in persuading the Czar to dismiss de Giers and adopt a warlike policy, in the belief that a strong Cabinet was about to be formed at Paris with Boulanger as the real motive power.  After a long ministerial crisis the proposed ministerial combination broke down; Boulanger was shelved, and the Czar is believed to have sharply rebuked Katkoff for his presumption[264].  This disappointment of his dearest hopes preyed on the health of that brilliant publicist and hastened his end, which occurred on August 1, 1887.

[Footnote 264:  This version (the usual one) is contested by Cyon, who says that Katkoff’s influence over the Czar was undermined by a mean German intrigue.]

The seed which Katkoff had sown was, however, to bring forth fruit.  Despite the temporary discomfiture of the Slavophils, events tended to draw France and Russia more closely together.  The formal statement of Signor Crispi that the Triple Alliance was a great and solid fact would alone have led to some counter move; and all the proofs of the instability of French politics furnished by the Grevy-Wilson scandals could not blind Russian statesmen to the need of some understanding with a great Power[265].

[Footnote 265:  See the Chauvinist pamphlets, Echec et Mat a la Politique de l’Ennemi de la France, by “un Russe” (Paris, 1887); and Necessite de l’Alliance franco-russe, by P. Pader (Toulouse, 1888).]