In France the advantage of a Russian alliance was being loudly asserted by General Boulanger—­then nearing the zenith of his popularity—­as also by that brilliant leader of society, Mme. Adam, and a cluster of satellites in the Press.  Even de Giers bowed before the idea of the hour, and allowed the newspaper which he inspired, Le Nord, to use these remarkable words (February 20, 1887): 

Henceforth Russia will watch the events on the Rhine, and relegates the Eastern Question to the second place.  The interests of Russia forbid her, in case of another Franco-German war, observing the same benevolent neutrality which she previously observed.  The Cabinet of St. Petersburg will in no case permit a further weakening of France.  In order to keep her freedom of action for this case, Russia will avoid all conflict with Austria and England, and will allow events to take their course in Bulgaria.

Thus, early in the year 1887, the tendency towards that equilibrium of the Powers, which is the great fact of recent European history, began to exercise a sedative effect on Russian policy in Bulgaria and in Central Asia.  That year saw the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan border, and the adjustment in Central Asian affairs of a balance corresponding to the equilibrium soon to be reached in European politics.  That, too, was the time when Bulgaria began firmly and successfully to assert her independence and to crush every attempt at a rising on the part of her Russophil officers.  This was seen after an attempt which they made at Rustchuk, when Stambuloff condemned nine of them to death.  The Russian Government having recalled all its agents from Bulgaria, the task of saving these rebels devolved on the German Consuls, who were then doing duty for Russia.  Their efforts were futile, and Katkoff used their failure as a means of poisoning the Czar’s mind not only against Germany, but also against de Giers, who had suggested the supervision of Russian interests by German Consuls[261].

[Footnote 261:  Elie de Cyon, op. cit. p. 274.]

Another incident of the spring-tide of 1887 kindled the Czar’s anger against the Teutons more fiercely and with more reason.  On April 20, a French police commissioner, Schnaebele, was arrested by two German agents or spies on the Alsacian border in a suspiciously brutal manner, and thrown into prison.  Far from soothing the profound irritation which this affair produced in France, Bismarck poured oil upon the flames a few days later by a speech which seemed designed to extort from France a declaration of war.  That, at least, was the impression produced on the mind of Alexander III., who took the unusual step of sending an autograph letter to the Emperor William I. He, in his turn, without referring the matter to Bismarck, gave orders for the instant release of Schnaebele[262].  Thus the incident closed; but the disagreeable impression which it created ended all chance of renewing the Three Emperors’ League.  The Skiernewice compact, which had been formed for three years, therefore came to an end.