[Footnote 260:  Elie de Cyon, op. cit. p. 38.]

For the present, then, Germany was safe.  Russia turned her energies against England and achieved the easy and profitable triumphs in Central Asia which nearly brought her to war with the British Government (see Chapter xiv.).

In the year 1884 Bismarck gained another success in bringing about the signature of a treaty of alliance between the three Empires.  It was signed on March 24, 1884, at Berlin, but was not ratified until September, during a meeting of the three Emperors at Skiernewice.  M. Elie de Cyon gives its terms as follows: 

(1) If one of the three contracting parties makes war on a fourth Power, the other two will maintain a benevolent neutrality. (To this Bismarck sought to add a corollary, that if two of them made war on a fourth Power, the third would equally remain neutral; but the Czar is said to have rejected this, in the interests of France.) (2) In case of a conflict in the Balkan Peninsula, the three Powers shall consult their own interests; and in the case of disagreement the third Power shall give a casting vote. (A protocol added here that Austria might annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and occupy Novi-Bazar.) (3) The former special treaties between Russia and Germany, or Russia and Austria, are annulled. (4) The three Powers will supervise the execution of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin respecting Turkey; and if the Porte allows a fourth Power (evidently England) to enter the Dardanelles, it will incur the hostility of one of the three Powers (Russia). (5) They will not oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia “if it comes about by the force of circumstances”; and will not allow Turkey to fortify the Balkan Passes.  Finally, by Article 6, they forbid any one of the contracting Powers to occupy the Balkan Principalities.  The compact held good only for three years.

If these terms are correctly stated, the treaty was a great triumph for Austria and Germany at the expense of Russia.  It is not surprising that the Czar finally broke away from the constraint imposed by the Skiernewice compact.  As we have seen, his conduct towards Bulgaria in 1885-86 brought him very near to a conflict with the Central Powers.  The mystery is why he ever joined them on terms so disadvantageous.  The explanation would seem to be that, like the King of Italy, he felt an alliance with the “conservative” Powers of Central Europe to be some safeguard against the revolutionary elements then so strong in Russia.

In the years 1886-87 that danger became less acute, and the dictates of self-interest in foreign affairs resumed their normal sway.  At the beginning of the year 1887 Katkoff regained his influence over the mind of the Czar by convincing him that the troubles in the Balkan Peninsula were fomented by the statesmen of Berlin and Vienna in order to distract his attention from Franco-German affairs.  Let Russia and France join hands, said Katkoff in effect, and then Russia would have a free hand in Balkan politics and could lay down the law in European matters generally.