Strange to say, the chief obstacle was Kaiser Wilhelm himself.  The old sovereign had very many claims on the gratitude of the German race, for his staunchness of character, singleness of aim, and homely good sense had made the triumphs of his reign possible.  But the newer light of to-day reveals the limitations of his character.  He never saw far ahead, and even in his survey of the present situation Prussian interests and family considerations held far too large a space.  It was so now.  Against the wishes of his Chancellor, he went to meet the Czar at Alexandrovo; and while the Austro-German compact took form at Gastein and Vienna, Czar and Kaiser were assuring each other of their unchanging friendship.  Doubtless Alexander II. was sincere in these professions of affection for his august uncle; but Bismarck paid more heed to the fact that Russia had recently made large additions to her army, while dense clouds of her horsemen hung about the Polish border, ready to flood the Prussian plains.  He saw safety only by opposing force to force.  As he said to his secretary, Busch:  “When we [Germany and Austria] are united, with our two million soldiers back to back, they [the Russians], with their Nihilism, will doubtless think twice before disturbing the peace.”  Finally the Emperor William agreed to the Austro-German compact, provided that the Czar should be informed that if he attacked Austria he would be opposed by both Powers[251].

[Footnote 251:  Bismarck:  Some Secret Pages of his History, by M. Busch, vol. ii. p. 404; Bismarck:  Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii. p. 268.]

It was not until November 5, 1887, that the terms of the treaty were made known, and then through the medium of the Times.  The official publication did not take place until February 3, 1888, at Berlin, Vienna, and Buda-Pesth.  The compact provides that if either Germany or Austria shall be attacked by Russia, each Power must assist its neighbour with all its forces.  If, however, the attack shall come from any other Power, the ally is pledged merely to observe neutrality; and not until Russia enters the field is the ally bound to set its armies in motion.  Obviously the second case implies an attack by France on Germany; in that case Austria would remain neutral, carefully watching the conduct of Russia.  As far as is known, the treaty does not provide for joint action, or mutual support, in regard to the Eastern Question, still less in matters further afield.

In order to give pause to Russia, Bismarck even indulged in a passing flirtation with England.  At the close of 1879, Lord Dufferin, then British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was passing through Berlin, and the Chancellor invited him to his estate at Varzin, and informed him that Russian overtures had been made to France through General Obretcheff, “but Chanzy [French ambassador at St. Petersburg], having reported that Russia was not ready, the French Government became less disposed than ever to embark on an adventurous policy[252].”