which he set forth in his letter of December 20, 1872, to the Count:—­“We want France to leave us in peace, and we have to prevent France finding an ally if she does not keep the peace.  As long as France has no allies she is not dangerous to Germany.”  A monarchical reaction, he thought, might lead France to accord with Russia or Austria.  A Republic of the type sought for by Gambetta could never achieve that task.  Better, then, the red flag waving at Paris than the fleur-de-lys.

Still more important was it to bring about complete accord between the three empires.  Here again the red spectre proved to be useful.  Various signs seemed to point to socialism as the common enemy of them all.  The doctrines of Bakunin, Herzen, and Lassalle had already begun to work threateningly in their midst, and Bismarck discreetly used this community of interest in one particular to bring about an agreement on matters purely political.  In the month of September 1872 he realised one of his dearest hopes.  The Czar, Alexander II., and the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, visited Berlin, where they were most cordially received.  At that city the chancellors of the three empires exchanged official memoranda—­there seems to have been no formal treaty[242]—­whereby they agreed to work together for the following purposes:  the maintenance of the boundaries recently laid down, the settlement of problems arising from the Eastern Question, and the repression of revolutionary movements in Europe.

[Footnote 242:  In his speech of February 19, 1878, Bismarck said, “The liaison of the three Emperors, which is habitually designated an alliance, rests on no written agreement and does not compel any one of the three Emperors to submit to the decisions of the two others.”]

Such was the purport of the Three Emperors’ League of 1872.  There is little doubt that Bismarck had worked on the Czar, always nervous as to the growth of the Nihilist movement in Russia, in order to secure his adhesion to the first two provisions of the new compact, which certainly did not benefit Russia.  The German Chancellor has since told us that, as early as the month of September 1870, he sought to form such a league, with the addition of the newly-united Italian realm, in order to safeguard the interests of monarchy against republicans and revolutionaries[243].  After the lapse of two years his wish took effect, though Italy as yet did not join the cause of order.  The new league stood forth as the embodiment of autocracy and a terror to the dissatisfied, whether revengeful Gauls, Danes, or Poles, intriguing cardinals—­it was the time of the “May Laws”—­or excited men who waved the red flag.  It was a new version of the Holy Alliance formed after Waterloo by the monarchs of the very same Powers, which, under the plea of watching against French enterprises, succeeded in bolstering up despotism on the Continent for a whole generation.

[Footnote 243:  Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe, vol. ii. pp. 458-59; Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii. ch. xxix.]