Lord Salisbury advised the Sultan not to send troops into Southern Bulgaria; and the warning chimed in with the note of timorous cunning which formed the undertone of that monarch’s thought and policy.  Distracted by the news of the warlike preparations of Servia and Greece, Abdul Hamid looked on Russia’s advice in a contrary sense as a piece of Muscovite treachery.  About the same time, too, there were rumours of palace plots at Constantinople; and the capricious recluse of Yildiz finally decided to keep his best troops near at hand.  It appears, then, that Nihilism in Russia and the spectre of conspiracy always haunting the brain of Abdul Hamid played their part in assuring the liberties of Bulgaria.

Meanwhile the Powers directed their ambassadors at Constantinople to hold a preliminary Conference at which Turkey would be represented.  The result was a declaration expressing formal disapproval of the violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and a hope that all parties concerned would keep the peace.  This mild protest very inadequately reflected the character of the discussions which had been going on between the several Courts.  Russia, it is known, wished to fasten the blame for the revolution on Prince Alexander; but all public censure was vetoed by England.

Probably her action was as effective in still weightier matters.  A formal Conference of the ambassadors of the Powers met at Constantinople on November 5; and there again Sir William White, acting on instructions from Lord Salisbury, defended the Bulgarian cause, and sought to bring about a friendly understanding between the Porte and “a people occupying so important a position in the Sultan’s dominions.”  Lord Salisbury also warned the Turkish ambassador in London that if Turkey sought to expel Prince Alexander from Eastern Roumelia, she would “be making herself the instrument of those who desired the fall of the Ottoman Empire[201].”

[Footnote 201:  Parl.  Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886), pp. 214-215.  See, too, ibid. pp. 197 et seq. for Lord Salisbury’s instructions to Sir William White for the Conference.  In view of them it is needless to waste space in refuting the arguments of the Russophil A.G.  Drandar, op. cit. p. 147, that England sought to make war between the Balkan States.]

This reference to the insidious means used by Russia for bringing the Turks to a state of tutelage, as a preliminary to partition, was an effective reminder of the humiliations which they had undergone at the hands of Russia by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833).  France also showed no disposition to join the Russian and Austrian demand that the Sultan should at once re-establish the status quo; and by degrees the more intelligent Turks came to see that a strong Bulgaria, independent of Russian control, might be an additional safeguard against the Colossus of the North.  Russia’s insistence on the exact fulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin helped to open their eyes, and lent force to Sir William White’s arguments as to the need of strengthening that treaty by “introducing into it a timely improvement[202].”