So sharp were the differences of opinion in England, that Russia would perhaps have disregarded the threats of the Beaconsfield Ministry had she not been face to face with a hostile Austria.  The great aim of the Czar’s government was to win over the Dual Monarchy by offering a share of the spoils of Turkey.  Accordingly, General Ignatieff went on a mission to the continental courts, especially to that of Vienna, and there is little doubt that he offered Bosnia to the Hapsburg Power.  That was the least which Francis Joseph and Count Andrassy had the right to expect, for the secret compact made before the war promised them as much.  In view of the enormous strides contemplated by Russia, they now asked for certain rights in connection with Servia and Montenegro, and commercial privileges that would open a way to Salonica[168].  But Russia’s aims, as expressed at San Stefano, clearly were to dominate the Greater Bulgaria there foreshadowed, which would probably shut out Austria from political and commercial influence over the regions north of Salonica.  Ignatieff’s effort to gain over Austria therefore failed; and it was doubtless Lord Beaconsfield’s confidence in the certainty of Hapsburg support in case of war that prompted his defiance alike of Russia and of the Liberal party at home.

[Footnote 168:  Debidour, Hist. diplomatique de l’Europe, vol. ii. p. 515.]

The Czar’s Government also was well aware of the peril of arousing a European war.  Nihilism lifted its head threateningly at home; and the Russian troops before Constantinople were dying like flies in autumn.  The outrages committed by them and the Bulgarians on the Moslems of Roumelia had, as we have seen, led to a revolt in the district of Mount Rhodope; and there was talk in some quarters of making a desperate effort to cut off the invaders from the Danube[169].  The discontent of the Roumanians might have been worked upon so as still further to endanger the Russian communications.  Probably the knowledge of these plans and of the warlike preparations of Great Britain induced the Russian Government to moderate its tone.  On April 9 it expressed a wish that Lord Salisbury would formulate a definite policy.

[Footnote 169:  For these outrages, see Parl.  Papers, Turkey (1878), Nos. 42 and 45, with numerous enclosures.  The larger plans of the Rhodope insurgents and their abettors at Constantinople are not fully known.  An Englishman, Sinclair, and some other free-lances were concerned in the affair.  The Rhodope district long retained a kind of independence, see Les Evenements politiques en Bulgarie, by A.G.  Drandar, Appendix.]

The new Foreign Minister speedily availed himself of this offer; and the cause of peace was greatly furthered by secret negotiations which he carried on with Count Shuvaloff.  The Russian ambassador in London had throughout bent his great abilities to a pacific solution of the dispute, and, on finding out the real nature of the British objections to the San Stefano Treaty, he proceeded to St. Petersburg to persuade the Emperor to accept certain changes.  In this he succeeded, and on his return to London was able to come to an agreement with Lord Salisbury (May 30), the chief terms of which clearly foreshadowed those finally adopted at Berlin.