Such was the general position when Parliament met at Westminster on January 17.  The Queen’s Speech contained the significant phrase that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence might render it incumbent to adopt measures of precaution.  Five days later it transpired that the Sultan had sent an appeal to Queen Victoria for her mediation with a view to arranging an armistice and the discussion of the preliminaries of peace.  In accordance with this appeal, the Queen telegraphed to the Emperor of Russia in these terms:—­

I have received a direct appeal from the Sultan which I cannot leave without an answer.  Knowing that you are sincerely desirous of peace, I do not hesitate to communicate this fact to you, in hope that you may accelerate the negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice which may lead to an honourable peace.

This communication was sent with the approval of the Cabinet.  The nature of the reply is not known.  Probably it was not encouraging; for on the next day (January 23) the British Admiralty ordered Admiral Hornby with the Mediterranean fleet to steam up the Dardanelles to Constantinople.  On the following day this was annulled, and the Admiral was directed not to proceed beyond Besika Bay[157].  The original order was the cause of the resignation of Lord Carnarvon.  The retirement of Lord Derby was also announced, but he afterwards withdrew it, probably on condition that the fleet did not enter the Sea of Marmora.

[Footnote 157:  For the odd mistake in a telegram, which caused the original order, see Sir Stafford Northcote, Earl of Iddesleigh, by Andrew Lang, vol. ii. pp. 111-112.]

Light was thus thrown on the dissensions in the Cabinet, and the vacillations in British policy.  Disraeli once said in his whimsical way that there were six parties in the Ministry.  The first party wanted immediate war with Russia; the second was for war in order to save Constantinople; the third was for peace at any price; the fourth would let the Russians take Constantinople and then turn them out; the fifth wanted to plant the cross on the dome of St. Sofia; “and then there are the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who desire to see something done, but don’t know exactly what[158].”  The coupling of himself with the amiable Sir Stafford Northcote is a good instance of Disraelian irony.  It is fairly certain that he was for war with Russia; that Lord Carnarvon constituted the third party, and Lord Derby the fourth.

[Footnote 158:  Ibid. pp. 105-106.  For the telegrams between the First Lord of the Admiralty, W.H.  Smith, and Admiral Hornby, see Life and Times of W.H.  Smith, by Sir H. Maxwell, vol. i. chap. xi.]

On the day after the resignation of Lord Carnarvon, the British Cabinet heard for the first time what were the demands of Russia.  They included the formation of a Greater Bulgaria, “within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality,” practically independent of the Sultan’s direct control; the entire independence of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro; a territorial and pecuniary indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war; and “an ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.”