Osman, either because he knew not that the Russians had used up their last reserves at Plevna, or because he mistrusted the manoeuvring powers of his men, allowed Kruedener quietly to draw off his shattered forces towards Sistova, and made only one rather half-hearted move against that all-important point.  The new Turkish commander-in-chief, Mehemet Ali, gathered a formidable array in front of Shumla and drove the Russian army now led by the Cesarewich back on Biela, but failed to pierce their lines.  Finally, Suleiman Pasha, in his pride at driving Gurko through the Khainkoi Pass, wasted time on the southern side, first by harrying the wretched Bulgarians, and then by hurling his brave troops repeatedly against the now almost impregnable position on the Shipka Pass.

It is believed that jealousy of the neighbouring Turkish generals kept Suleiman from adopting less wasteful and more effective tactics.  If he had made merely a feint of attacking that post, and had hurried with his main body through the Slievno Pass on the east to the aid of Mehemet, or through the western defiles of the Balkans to the help of the brave Osman in his Plevna-Lovtcha positions, probably the gain of force to one or other of them might have led to really great results.  As it was, these generals dealt heavy losses to the invaders, but failed to drive them back on the Danube.

Moreover, Russian reinforcements began to arrive by the middle of August, the Emperor having already, on July 22, called out the first ban of the militia and three divisions of the reserve of the line, in all some 224,000 men[145].

[Footnote 145:  F.V.  Greene, The Campaign in Bulgaria, p. 225.]

The bulk of these men did not arrive until September; and meanwhile the strain was terrible.  The war correspondence of Mr. Archibald Forbes reveals the state of nervous anxiety in which Alexander II. was plunged at this time.  Forbes had been a witness of the savage tenacity of the Turkish attack and the Russian defence on the hills commanding the Shipka Pass.  Finally, he had shared in the joy of the hard-pressed defenders at the timely advent of a rifle battalion hastily sent up on Cossack ponies, and the decisive charge of General Radetzky at the head of two companies of reserves at a Turkish breastwork in the very crisis of the fight (Aug. 24).  Then, after riding post-haste northwards to the Russian headquarters at Gornisstuden, he was at once taken to the Czar’s tent, and noted the look of eager suspense on his face until he heard the reassuring news that Radetzky kept his seat firm on the pass.

The worst was now over.  The Russian Guards, 50,000 strong, were near at hand, along with the other reinforcements above named.  The urgency of the crisis also led the Grand Duke Nicholas to waive his claim that the Roumanian troops should be placed under his immediate command.  Accordingly, early in August, Prince Charles led some 35,000 Roumanians across the Danube, and was charged with the command of all the troops around Plevna[146].  The hopes of the invaders were raised by Skobeleff’s capture, on September 3, of Lovtcha, a place half-way between Plevna and the Balkans, which had ensured Osman’s communications with Suleiman Pasha.  The Turkish losses at Lovtcha are estimated at nearly 15,000 men[147].