Nevertheless, Generals Kruedener and Schahofski received orders to attack forthwith.  They did so on July 31.  The latter, with 12,000 men took two of the outer redoubts on the south side, but had to fall back before the deadly fire that poured on him from the inner works.  Kruedener operated against the still stronger positions on the north; but, owing to difficulties that beset his advance, he was too late to make any diversion in favour of his colleague.  In a word, the attack was ill planned and still worse combined.  Five hours of desperate fighting yielded the assailants not a single substantial gain; their losses were stated officially to be 7336 killed and wounded; but this is certainly below the truth.  Turkish irregulars followed the retreating columns at nightfall, and butchered the wounded, including all whom they found in a field-hospital.

This second reverse at Plevna was a disaster of the first magnitude.  The prolongation of the Russian line beyond the Balkans had left their base and flanks too weak to stand against the terrible blows that Osman seemed about to deal from his point of vantage.  Plevna was to their right flank what Biela was to their left.  Troops could not be withdrawn from the latter point lest the Turks from Shumla and Rustchuk should break through and cut their way to the bridge at Sistova; and now Osman’s force threatened that spinal cord of the Russian communications.  If he struck how could the blow be warded off?  For bad news poured in from all quarters.  From Armenia came the tidings that Mukhtar Pasha, after a skilful retreat and concentration of force, had turned on the Russians and driven them back in utter confusion.

From beyond the Balkans Gurko sent news that Suleiman’s army was working round by way of Adrianople, and threatened to pin him to the mountain chain.  In fact, part of Gurko’s corps sustained a serious reverse at Eski Zagra, and had to retreat in haste through the Khainkoi Pass; while its other sections made their way back to the Shipka Pass, leaving a rearguard to hold that important position (July 30-August 8).  Thus, on all sides, proofs accumulated that the invaders had attempted far too much for their strength, and that their whole plan of campaign was more brilliant than sound.  Possibly, had not the 14th corps been thrown away on the unhealthy Dobrudscha, enough men would have been at hand to save the situation.  But now everything was at stake.

The whole of the month of August was a time of grave crisis for the Russians, and it is the opinion of the best military critics that the Turks, with a little more initiative and power of combination, might have thrown the Russians back on the Danube in utter disarray.  From this extremity the invaders were saved by the lack among the Turks of the above-named gifts, on which, rather than on mere bravery, the issue of campaigns and the fate of nations now ultimately depend.  True to their old renown, the Turks showed signal prowess on the field of battle, but they lacked the higher intellectual qualities that garner the full harvest of results.