The United States attache to the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish War afterwards spoke of his military genius as “stupendous,” and prophesied that, should he live twenty years longer, and lead the Russian armies in the next Turkish war, he would win a place side by side with “Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, and Moltke.”  To equate these four names is a mark of transatlantic enthusiasm rather than of balanced judgment; but the estimate, so far as it concerns Skobeleff, reflects the opinion of nearly all who knew him[138].

[Footnote 138:  F.V.  Green, Sketches of Army Life in Russia, p. 142.]

Encouraged by the advent of Skobeleff and Dragomiroff, the Russians assumed the offensive with full effect, and by the afternoon of that eventful day, had mastered the rising ground behind Sistova.  Here again the Turkish defence was tame.  The town was unfortified, but its outskirts presented facilities for defence.  Nevertheless, under the pressure of the Russian attack and of artillery fire from the north bank, the small Turkish garrison gave up the town and retreated towards Rustchuk.  At many points on that day the Russians treated their foes to a heavy bombardment or feints of crossing, especially at Nicopolis and Rustchuk; and this accounts for the failure of the defenders to help the weak garrison on which fell the brunt of the attack.  All things considered, the crossing of the Danube must rank as a highly creditable achievement, skilfully planned and stoutly carried out; it cost the invaders scarcely 700 men[139].

[Footnote 139:  Farcy, La Guerre sur le Danube, ch. viii.; Daily News Correspondence of the War of 1877-78, ch. viii.]

They now threw a pontoon-bridge across the Danube between Simnitza and Sistova; and by July 2 had 65,000 men and 244 cannon in and near the latter town.  Meanwhile, their 14th corps held the central position of Babadagh in the Dobrudscha, thereby preventing any attack from the north-east side of the Quadrilateral against their communications with the south of Russia.

It may be questioned, however, whether the invaders did well to keep so large a force in the Dobrudscha, seeing that a smaller body of light troops patrolling the left bank of the lower Danube or at the tete de pont at Matchin would have answered the same purpose.  The chief use of the crossing at Matchin was to distract the attention of the enemy, an advance through the unhealthy district of the Dobrudscha against the Turkish Quadrilateral being in every way risky; above all, the retention of a whole corps on that side weakened the main line of advance, that from Sistova; and here it was soon clear that the Russians had too few men for the enterprise in hand.  The pontoon-bridge over the Danube was completed by July 2—­a fact which enabled those troops which were in Roumania to be hurried forward to the front.

Obviously it was unsafe to march towards the Balkans until both flanks were secured against onsets from the Quadrilateral on the east, and from Nicopolis and Widdin on the west.  At Nicopolis, twenty-five miles away, there were about 10,000 Turks; and around Widdin, about 100 miles farther up the stream, Osman mustered 40,000 more.  To him Abdul-Kerim now sent an order to march against the flank of the invaders.