Staff and the unblushing peculation of its subordinates and contractors clogged the wheels of the military machine.  One result of it was seen in the bad bread supplied to the troops.  A Roumanian officer, when dining with the Grand Duke Nicholas, ventured to compare the ration bread of the Russians with the far better bread supplied to his own men at cheaper rates.  The Grand Duke looked at the two specimens and then—­talked of something else[135].  Nothing could be done until the flood subsided and large bodies of troops were ready to threaten the Turkish line of defence at several points[136].  The Ottoman position by no means lacked elements of strength.  The first of these was the Danube itself.  The task of crossing a great river in front of an active foe is one of the most dangerous of all military operations.  Any serious miscalculation of the strength, the position, or the mobility of the enemy’s forces may lead to an irreparable disaster; and until the bridges used for the crossing are defended by tetes de pont the position of the column that has passed over is precarious.

[Footnote 135:  Farcy, La Guerre sur le Danube, p. 73.  For other malpractices see Colonel F.A.  Wellesley’s With the Russians in Peace and War, chs. xi. xii.]

[Footnote 136:  Punch hit off the situation by thus parodying the well-known line of Horace:  “Russicus expectat dum defluat amnis.”]

The Danube is especially hard to cross, because its northern bank is for the most part marshy, and is dominated by the southern bank.  The German strategist, von Moltke, who knew Turkey well, and had written the best history of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, maintained that the passage of the Danube must cost the invaders upwards of 50,000 men.  Thereafter, they would be threatened by the Quadrilateral of fortresses—­Rustchuk, Shumla, Varna, and Silistria.  Three of these were connected by railway, which enabled the Turks to send troops quickly from the port of Varna to any position between the mountain stronghold of Shumla and the riverine fortress, Rustchuk.

Even the non-military reader will see by a glance at the map that this Quadrilateral, if strongly held, practically barred the roads leading to the Balkans on their eastern side.  It also endangered the march of an invading army through the middle of Bulgaria to the central passes of that chain.  Moreover, there are in that part only two or three passes that can be attempted by an army with artillery.  The fortress of Widdin, where Osman Pasha was known to have an army of about 40,000 seasoned troops, dominated the west of Bulgaria and the roads leading to the easier passes of the Balkans near Sofia.

These being the difficulties that confronted the invaders in Europe, it is not surprising that the first important battles took place in Asia.  On the Armenian frontier the Russians, under Loris Melikoff, soon gained decided advantages, driving back the Turks with considerable losses on Kars and Erzeroum.  The tide of war soon turned in that quarter, but, for the present, the Muscovite triumphs sent a thrill of fear through Turkey, and probably strengthened the determination of Abdul-Kerim, the Turkish commander-in-chief in Europe, to maintain a cautious defensive.