[3] Busch, Our Chancellor, vol. ii. p. 17 (Eng. edit.); Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe (1814-1878), vol ii. pp. 291-293.  Lord Loftus in his Diplomatic Reminiscences (vol. ii. p. 280) says:  “So satisfied was Bismarck that he could count on the neutrality of France, that no defensive military measures were taken on the Rhine and western frontier.  He had no fears of Russia on the eastern frontier, and was therefore able to concentrate the military might of Prussia against Austria and her South German Allies.”

Light has been thrown on the bargainings between Italy and Prussia by the Memoirs of General Govone, who found Bismarck a hard bargainer.

Bismarck and the leaders of the Prussian army had few doubts as to the result.  They were determined to force on the war, and early in June 1866 brought forward proposals at the Frankfurt Diet for the “reform” of the German Confederation, the chief of them being the exclusion of Austria, the establishment of a German Parliament elected by manhood suffrage, and the formation of a North German army commanded by the King of Prussia.

A great majority of the Federal Diet rejected these proposals, and war speedily broke out, Austria being supported by nearly all the German States except the two Mecklenburgs.

The weight of numbers was against Prussia, even though she had the help of the Italians operating against Venetia.  On that side Austria was completely successful, as also in a sea-fight near Lissa in the Adriatic; but in the north the Hapsburgs and their German allies soon found out that organisation, armament, and genius count for more than numbers.  The great organiser, von Roon, had brought Prussia’s citizen army to a degree of efficiency that surprised every one; and the quick-firing “needle-gun” dealt havoc and terror among the enemy.  Using to the full the advantage of her central position against the German States, Prussia speedily worsted their isolated and badly-handled forces, while her chief armies overthrew those of Austria and Saxony in Bohemia.  The Austrian plan of campaign had been to invade Prussia by two armies—­a comparatively small force advancing from Cracow as a base into Silesia, while another, acting from Olmuetz, advanced through Bohemia to join the Saxons and march on Berlin, some 50,000 Bavarians joining them in Bohemia for the same enterprise.  This design speedily broke down owing to the short-sighted timidity of the Bavarian Government, which refused to let its forces leave their own territory; the lack of railway facilities in the Austrian Empire also hampered the moving of two large armies to the northern frontier.  Above all, the swift and decisive movements of the Prussians speedily drove the allies to act on the defensive—­itself a grave misfortune in war.