Nevertheless, Alexander II. still sought to maintain the European Concert with a view to the exerting of pacific pressure upon Turkey.  Early in March he despatched General Ignatieff on a mission to the capitals of the Great Powers; except at Westminster, that envoy found opinion favourable to the adoption of some form of coercion against Turkey, in case the Sultan still hardened his heart against good advice.  Even the Beaconsfield Ministry finally agreed to sign a Protocol, that of March 31, 1877, which recounted the efforts of the six Great Powers for the improvement of the lot of the Christians in Turkey, and expressed their approval of the promises of reform made by that State on February 13, 1876.  Passing over without notice the new Turkish Constitution, the Powers declared that they would carefully watch the carrying out of the promised reforms, and that, if no improvement in the lot of the Christians should take place, “they [the Powers] reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the wellbeing of the Christian populations, and the interests of the general peace[117].”  This final clause contained a suggestion scarcely less threatening than that with which the Berlin Memorandum had closed; and it is difficult to see why the British Cabinet, which now signed the London Protocol, should have wrecked that earlier effort of the Powers.  In this as in other matters it is clear that the Cabinet was swayed by a “dual control.”

[Footnote 117:  Parl.  Papers, Turkey, No. 9 (1877), p. 2.]

But now it was all one whether the British Government signed the Protocol or not.  Turkey would have none of it.  Despite Lord Derby’s warning that “the Sultan would be very unwise if he would not endeavour to avail himself of the opportunity afforded him to arrange a mutual disarmament,” that potentate refused to move a hair’s-breadth from his former position.  On the 12th of April the Turkish ambassador announced to Lord Derby the final decision of his Government:  “Turkey, as an independent State, cannot submit to be placed under any surveillance, whether collective or not. . . .  No consideration can arrest the Imperial Government in their determination to protest against the Protocol of the 31st March, and to consider it, as regards Turkey, as devoid of all equity, and consequently of all binding character.”  Lord Derby thereupon expressed his deep regret at this decision, and declared that he “did not see what further steps Her Majesty’s Government could take to avert a war which appeared to have become inevitable[118].”

[Footnote 118:  Parl.  Papers, Turkey, No. 15 (1877), pp. 354-355.]