The issue was thus clear as far as concerned Russia.  It was not so clear for Great Britain.  Even now, we are in ignorance as to the real intent of Lord Beaconsfield’s speech at the Guildhall.  It seems probable that, as there were divisions in his Cabinet, he may have wished to bring about such a demonstration of public feeling as would strengthen his hands in proposing naval and military preparations.  The duties of a Prime Minister are so complex that his words may be viewed either in an international sense, or as prompted by administrative needs, or by his relations to his colleagues, or, again, they may be due merely to electioneering considerations.  Whatever their real intent on this occasion, they were interpreted by Russia as a defiance and by Turkey as a promise of armed help.

On the other hand, if Lord Beaconsfield hoped to strengthen the pro-Turkish feeling in the Cabinet and the country, he failed.  The resentment aroused by Turkish methods of rule and repression was too deep to be eradicated even by his skilful appeals to Imperialist sentiment.  The Bulgarian atrocities had at least brought this much of good:  they rendered a Turco-British alliance absolutely impossible.

Lord Derby had written to this effect on August 29 to Sir Henry Elliott:  “The impression produced here by events in Bulgaria has completely destroyed sympathy with Turkey.  The feeling is universal and so strong that even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, Her Majesty’s Government would find it practically impossible to interfere[108].”

[Footnote 108:  Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 6 (1877).]

The assembly of a Conference of the envoys of the Powers at Constantinople was claimed to be a decisive triumph for British diplomacy.  There were indeed some grounds for hoping that Turkey would give way before a reunited Europe.  The pressure brought to bear on the British Cabinet by public opinion resulted in instructions being given to Lord Salisbury (our representative, along with Sir H. Elliott, at the Conference) which did not differ much from the avowed aims of Russia and of the other Powers.  Those instructions stated that the Powers could not accept mere promises of reform, for “the whole history of the Ottoman Empire, since it was admitted into the European Concert under the engagements of the Treaty of Paris [1856], has proved that the Porte is unable to guarantee the execution of reforms in the provinces by Turkish officials, who accept them with reluctance and neglect them with impunity.”  The Cabinet, therefore, insisted that there must be “external guarantees,” but stipulated that no foreign armies must be introduced into Turkey[109].  Here alone British Ministers were at variance with the other Powers; and when, in the preliminary meetings of the Conference, a proposal was made to bring Belgian troops in order to guarantee the thorough execution of the proposed reforms, Lord Salisbury did not oppose it.  In pursuance of instructions from London, he even warned the Porte that Britain would not give any help in case war resulted from its refusal of the European proposals.