the leaders of the Opposition to voice what was undoubtedly the national sentiment.  To have kept silence would have been to stultify our Parliamentary institutions.  The parrot cry that British interests were endangered by Russia’s supposed designs on Turkey, was met by the unanswerable reply that, if those designs existed, the best way to check them was to maintain the European Concert, and especially to keep in close touch with Austria, seeing that that Power had as much cause as England to dread any southward extension of the Czar’s power.  Russia might conceivably fight Turkey and Great Britain; but she would not wage war against Austria as well.  Therefore, the dictates of humanity as well as those of common sense alike condemned the British policy, which from the outset had encouraged the Turks to resist European intervention, had made us in some measure responsible for the Bulgarian massacres, and, finally, had broken up the Concert of the Powers, from which alone a peaceful solution of the Eastern Question could be expected.

The union of the Powers having been dissolved by British action, it was but natural that Russia and Austria should come to a private understanding.  This came about at Reichstadt in Bohemia on July 8.  No definitive treaty was signed, but the two Emperors and their Chancellors framed an agreement defining their spheres of influence in the Balkans in case war should break out between Russia and Turkey.  Francis Joseph of Austria covenanted to observe a neutrality friendly to the Czar under certain conditions that will be noticed later on.  Some of those conditions were distasteful to the Russian Government, which sounded Bismarck as to his attitude in case war broke out between the Czar and the Hapsburg ruler.  Apparently the reply of the German Chancellor was unfavourable to Russia[106], for it thereafter renewed the negotiations with the Court of Vienna.  On the whole, the ensuing agreement was a great diplomatic triumph; for the Czar thereby secured the neutrality of Austria—­a Power that might readily have remained in close touch with Great Britain had British diplomacy displayed more foresight.

[Footnote 106:  Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences vol. ii. chap, xxviii.]

The prospects of a great war, meanwhile, had increased owing to the action of Servia and Montenegro.  The rulers of those States, unable any longer to hold in their peoples, and hoping for support from their Muscovite kinsfolk, declared war on Turkey at the end of June.  Russian volunteers thronged to the Servian forces by thousands; but, despite the leadership of the Russian General, Tchernayeff, they were soon overborne by the numbers and fanatical valour of the Turks.  Early in September, Servia appealed to the Powers for their mediation; and, owing chiefly to the efforts of Great Britain, terms for an armistice were proposed by the new Sultan, Abdul Hamid, but of so hard a nature that the Servians rejected them.