Such was the position, and such the considerations, that led the three Empires to adopt more drastic proposals.  Having found, meanwhile, by informal conferences with the Herzegovinian leaders, what were the essentials to a lasting settlement, they prepared to embody them in a second Note, the Berlin Memorandum, issued on May 13.  It was drawn up by the three Imperial Chancellors at Berlin, but Andrassy is known to have given a somewhat doubtful consent.  T his “Berlin Memorandum” demanded the adoption of an armistice for two months; the repatriation of the Bosnian exiles and fugitives; the establishment of a mixed Commission for that purpose; the removal of Turkish troops from the rural districts of Bosnia; the right of the Consuls of the European Powers to see to the carrying out of all the promised reforms.  Lastly, the Memorandum stated that if within two months the three Imperial Courts did not attain the end they had in view (viz. the carrying out of the needed reforms), it would become necessary to take “efficacious measures” for that purpose[96].  Bismarck is known to have favoured the policy of Gortchakoff in this affair.

[Footnote 96:  Hertslet, iv. pp. 2459-2463.]

The proposals of the Memorandum were at once sent to the British, French, and Italian Governments for their assent.  The two last immediately gave it.  After a brief delay the Disraeli Ministry sent a decisive refusal and made no alternative proposal, though one of its members, Sir Stafford Northcote, is known to have formulated a scheme[97].  The Cabinet took a still more serious step:  on May 24, it ordered the British fleet in the Mediterranean to steam to Besika Bay, near the entrance to the Dardanelles—­the very position it had taken before the Crimean War[98].  It is needless to say that this act not only broke up the “European Concert,” but ended all hopes of compelling Turkey at once to grant the much-needed reforms.  That compulsion would have been irresistible had the British fleet joined the Powers in preventing the landing of troops from Asia Minor in the Balkan Peninsula.  As it was, the Turks could draw those reinforcements without hindrance.

[Footnote 97:  Sir Stafford Northcote, Earl of Iddesleigh, by Andrew Lang, vol. ii. p. 181.]

[Footnote 98:  Our ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliott, asked (May 9) that a squadron should be sent there to reassure the British subjects in Turkey; but as the fleet was not ordered to proceed thither until after a long interval, and was kept there in great strength and for many months, it is fair to assume that the aim of our Government was to encourage Turkey.] The Berlin Memorandum was, of course, not presented to Turkey, and partly owing to the rapid changes which then took place at Constantinople.  To these we must now advert.