[Footnote 92:  For the full text, see Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, iv. pp. 2418-2429.]

These proposals would probably have been sent to the Porte before the close of 1875 but for the diplomatic intervention of the British Cabinet.  Affairs at London were then in the hands of that skilful and determined statesman, Disraeli, soon to become Lord Beaconsfield.  It is impossible to discuss fully the causes of that bias in his nature which prejudiced him against supporting the Christians of Turkey.  Those causes were due in part to the Semitic instincts of his Jewish ancestry,—­the Jews having consistently received better treatment from the Turks than from the Russians,—­and in part to his staunch Imperialism, which saw in Muscovite expansion the chief danger to British communications with India.  Mr. Bryce has recently pointed out in a suggestive survey of Disraeli’s character that tradition had great weight with him[93].  It is known to have been a potent influence on the mind of Queen Victoria; and, as the traditional policy at Whitehall was to support Turkey against Russia, all the personal leanings, which count for so much, told in favour of a continuance in the old lines, even though the circumstances had utterly changed since the time of the Crimean War.

[Footnote 93:  Bryce, Studies in Contemporary Biography (1904).]

When, therefore, Disraeli became aware that pressure was about to be applied to the Porte by the three Powers above named, he warned them that he considered any such action to be inopportune, seeing that Turkey ought to be allowed time to carry out a programme of reforms of recent date.  By an irade of October 2, 1875, the Sultan had promised to all his Christian subjects a remission of taxation and the right of choosing not only the controllers of taxes, but also delegates to supervise their rights at Constantinople.

In taking these promises seriously, Disraeli stood almost alone.  But his speech of November 9, 1875, at the Lord Mayor’s banquet, showed that he viewed the Eastern Question solely from the standpoint of British interests.  His acts spoke even more forcibly than his words.  That was the time when the dawn of Imperialism flushed all the eastern sky.  H.R.H. the Prince of Wales had just begun his Indian tour amidst splendid festivities at Bombay; and the repetition of these in the native States undoubtedly did much to awaken interest in our Eastern Empire and cement the loyalty of its Princes and peoples.  Next, at the close of the month of November, came the news that the British Government had bought the shares in the Suez Canal, previously owned by the Khedive of Egypt, for the sum of L4,500,000[94].  The transaction is now acknowledged by every thinking man to have been a master-stroke of policy, justified on all grounds, financial and Imperial.  In those days it met with sharp censure from Disraeli’s opponents.  In a sense this was natural; for it seemed to be part of a scheme for securing British influence in the Levant and riding roughshod over the susceptibilities of the French (the constructors of the canal) and the plans of Russia.  Everything pointed to the beginning of a period of spirited foreign policy which would lead to war with Russia.