Now, this action violated the last treaty—­that signed by the Powers at London in 1852, which settled the affairs of the Duchies; and Bismarck therefore had strong ground for appealing to the Powers concerned, as also to the German Confederation, against this breach of treaty obligations.  The Powers, especially England and France, sought to set things straight, but the efforts of our Foreign Minister, Lord John Russell, had no effect.  The German Confederation also refused to take any steps about Schleswig as being outside its jurisdiction.  Bismarck next persuaded Austria to help Prussia in defeating Danish designs on that duchy.  The Danes, on the other hand, counted on the unofficial expressions of sympathy which came from the people of Great Britain and France at sight of a small State menaced by two powerful monarchies.  In fact, the whole situation was complicated by this explosion of feeling, which seemed to the Danes to portend the armed intervention of the Western States, especially England, on their behalf.  As far as is known, no official assurance to that effect ever went forth from London.  In fact, it is certain that Queen Victoria absolutely forbade any such step; but the mischief done by sentimental orators, heedless newspaper-editors, and factious busybodies, could not be undone.  As Lord John Russell afterwards stated in a short “Essay on the Policy of England”:  “It pleased some English advisers of great influence to meddle in this affair; they were successful in thwarting the British Government, and in the end, with the professed view, and perhaps the real intention, of helping Denmark, their friendship tended to deprive her of Holstein and Schleswig altogether.”  This final judgment of a veteran statesman is worth quoting as showing his sense of the mischief done by well-meant but misguided sympathy, which pushed the Danes on to ruin and embittered our relations with Prussia for many years.

Not that the conduct of the German Powers was flawless.  On January 16, 1864, they sent to Copenhagen a demand for the withdrawal of the constitution for Schleswig within two days.  The Danish Foreign Minister pointed out that, as the Rigsraad was not in session, this could not possibly be done within two days.  In this last step, then, the German Powers were undoubtedly the aggressors[1].  The Prussian troops were ready near the River Eider, and at once invaded Schleswig.  The Danes were soon beaten on the mainland; then a pause occurred, during which a Conference of the Powers concerned was held at London.  It has been proved by the German historian, von Sybel, that the first serious suggestion to Prussia that she should take both the Duchies came secretly from Napoleon III.  It was in vain that Lord John Russell suggested a sensible compromise, namely, the partition of Schleswig between Denmark and Germany according to the language-frontier inside the Duchy.  To this the belligerents demurred on points of detail, the Prussian representative asserting that he would not leave a single German under Danish rule.  The war was therefore resumed, and ended in a complete defeat for the weaker State, which finally surrendered both Duchies to Austria and Prussia (1864)[2].