a world that, in spite of all the warnings of
the past, has allowed itself to be caught once
more in the terrible naturalistic trap. The dissolution
of civilisation with which we are threatened is
likely to be worse in some respects than that
of Greece or Rome, in view of the success that
has been obtained in ‘perfecting the mystery
of murder.’ Various traditional agencies
are indeed still doing much to chain up the beast
in man. Of these the chief is no doubt the Church.
But the leadership of the Occident is no longer
here. The leaders have succumbed in greater
or less degree to naturalism, and so have been tampering
with the moral law. That the brutal imperialist
who brooks no obstacle to his lust for domination
has been tampering with this law goes without
saying, but the humanitarian, all adrip with brotherhood
and profoundly convinced of the loveliness of his own
soul, has been tampering with it also, and in a
more dangerous way, for the very reason that it
is less obvious. This tampering with the
moral law, or, what amounts to the same thing, this
overriding of the veto power in man, has been
largely a result, though not a necessary result,
of the rupture with the traditional forms of wisdom.
The Baconian naturalist repudiated the past because
he wished to be more positive and critical, to
plant himself on the facts. But the veto
power is itself a fact—the weightiest with
which man has to reckon. The Rousseauistic
naturalist threw off traditional control because
he wished to be more imaginative. Yet without
the veto power imagination falls into sheer anarchy.
Both Baconian and Rousseauist were very impatient
of any outer authority that seemed to stand between
them and their own perceptions. Yet the veto
power is nothing abstract, nothing that one needs to
take on hearsay, but is very immediate. The
naturalistic leaders may be proved wrong without
going beyond their own principles, and their wrongness
is of a kind to wreck civilisation.’
We find it impossible to refuse our assent to the
main counts of this indictment. The deanthropocentrised
universe of science is not the universe in which man
has to live. That universe is at once smaller
and larger than the universe of science: smaller
in material extent, larger in spiritual possibility.
Therefore to allow the perspective of science seriously
to influence, much less control, our human values,
is an invitation to disaster. Humanism must reassert
itself, for even we can see that Shakespeares are
better than Hamlets. The reassertion of humanism
involves the re-creation of a practical ideal of human
life and conduct, and a strict subordination of the
impulses of the individual to this ideal. There
must now be a period of critical and humanistic positivism
in regard to ethics and to art. We may say frankly
that it is not to our elders that we think of applying
for its rudiments. We regard them as no less
misguided and a good deal less honest than ourselves,
It is among our anarchists that we shall look most
hopefully for our new traditionalists, if only because,
in literature at least, they are more keenly aware
of the nature of the abyss on the brink of which they
are trembling.