and is infinitely interested in existing, an abstract thinker, similarly compounded, is a double being, a fantastical being, who lives in the pure being of abstraction, and at times presents the sorry figure of a professor who lays aside this abstract essence as he lays aside his walking-stick.  When one reads the Life of a thinker of this kind—­whose writings may be excellent—­one trembles at the thought of what it is to be a man.  And when one reads in his writings that thinking and being are the same thing, one thinks, remembering his life, that that being, which is identical with thinking, is not precisely the same thing as being a man” (Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, chap. iii.).

What intense passion—­that is to say, what truth—­there is in this bitter invective against Hegel, prototype of the rationalist!—­for the rationalist takes away our fever by taking away our life, and promises us, instead of a concrete, an abstract immortality, as if the hunger for immortality that consumes us were an abstract and not a concrete hunger!

It may indeed be said that when once the dog is dead there is an end to the rabies, and that after I have died I shall no more be tortured by this rage of not dying, and that the fear of death, or more properly, of nothingness, is an irrational fear, but ...  Yes, but ... Eppur si muove! And it will go on moving.  For it is the source of all movement!

I doubt, however, whether our brother Kierkegaard is altogether in the right, for this same abstract thinker, or thinker of abstractions, thinks in order that he may exist, that he may not cease to exist, or thinks perhaps in order to forget that he will have to cease to exist.  This is the root of the passion for abstract thought.  And possibly Hegel was as infinitely interested as Kierkegaard in his own concrete, individual existence, although the professional decorum of the state-philosopher compelled him to conceal the fact.

Faith in immortality is irrational.  And, notwithstanding, faith, life, and reason have mutual need of one another.  This vital longing is not properly a problem, cannot assume a logical status, cannot be formulated in propositions susceptible of rational discussion; but it announces itself in us as hunger announces itself.  Neither can the wolf that throws itself with the fury of hunger upon its prey or with the fury of instinct upon the she-wolf, enunciate its impulse rationally and as a logical problem.  Reason and faith are two enemies, neither of which can maintain itself without the other.  The irrational demands to be rationalized and reason only can operate on the irrational.  They are compelled to seek mutual support and association.  But association in struggle, for struggle is a mode of association.