If a philosopher is not a man, he is anything but a philosopher; he is above all a pedant, and a pedant is a caricature of a man.  The cultivation of any branch of science—­of chemistry, of physics, of geometry, of philology—­may be a work of differentiated specialization, and even so only within very narrow limits and restrictions; but philosophy, like poetry, is a work of integration and synthesis, or else it is merely pseudo-philosophical erudition.

All knowledge has an ultimate object.  Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is, say what you will, nothing but a dismal begging of the question.  We learn something either for an immediate practical end, or in order to complete the rest of our knowledge.  Even the knowledge that appears to us to be most theoretical—­that is to say, of least immediate application to the non-intellectual necessities of life—­answers to a necessity which is no less real because it is intellectual, to a reason of economy in thinking, to a principle of unity and continuity of consciousness.  But just as a scientific fact has its finality in the rest of knowledge, so the philosophy that we would make our own has also its extrinsic object—­it refers to our whole destiny, to our attitude in face of life and the universe.  And the most tragic problem of philosophy is to reconcile intellectual necessities with the necessities of the heart and the will.  For it is on this rock that every philosophy that pretends to resolve the eternal and tragic contradiction, the basis of our existence, breaks to pieces.  But do all men face this contradiction squarely?

Little can be hoped from a ruler, for example, who has not at some time or other been preoccupied, even if only confusedly, with the first beginning and the ultimate end of all things, and above all of man, with the “why” of his origin and the “wherefore” of his destiny.

And this supreme preoccupation cannot be purely rational, it must involve the heart.  It is not enough to think about our destiny:  it must be felt.  And the would-be leader of men who affirms and proclaims that he pays no heed to the things of the spirit, is not worthy to lead them.  By which I do not mean, of course, that any ready-made solution is to be required of him.  Solution?  Is there indeed any?

So far as I am concerned, I will never willingly yield myself, nor entrust my confidence, to any popular leader who is not penetrated with the feeling that he who orders a people orders men, men of flesh and bone, men who are born, suffer, and, although they do not wish to die, die; men who are ends in themselves, not merely means; men who must be themselves and not others; men, in fine, who seek that which we call happiness.  It is inhuman, for example, to sacrifice one generation of men to the generation which follows, without having any feeling for the destiny of those who are sacrificed, without having any regard, not for their memory, not for their names, but for them themselves.