When our Catholic theologians seek to justify rationally—­or in other words, ethically—­the dogma of the eternity of the pains of hell, they put forward reasons so specious, ridiculous, and childish, that it would appear impossible that they should ever have obtained currency.  For to assert that since God is infinite, an offence committed against Him is infinite also and therefore demands an eternal punishment, is, apart from the inconceivability of an infinite offence, to be unaware that, in human ethics, if not in the human police system, the gravity of the offence is measured not by the dignity of the injured person but by the intention of the injurer, and that to speak of an infinite culpable intention is sheer nonsense, and nothing else.  In this connection those words which Christ addressed to His Father are capable of application:  “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” and no man who commits an offence against God or his neighbour knows what he does.  In human ethics, or if you like in human police regulations—­that which is called penal law and is anything but law[52] eternal punishment is a meaningless phrase.

“God is just and punishes us; that is all we need to know; as far as we are concerned the rest is merely curiosity.”  Such was the conclusion of Lamennais (Essai, etc., iv^e partie, chap, vii.), an opinion shared by many others.  Calvin also held the same view.  But is there anyone who is content with this?  Pure curiosity!—­to call this load that wellnigh crushes our heart pure curiosity!

May we not say, perhaps, that the evil man is annihilated because he wished to be annihilated, or that he did not wish strongly enough to eternalize himself because he was evil?  May we not say that it is not believing in the other life that makes a man good, but rather that being good makes him believe in it?  And what is being good and being evil?  These states pertain to the sphere of ethics, not of religion:  or, rather, does not the doing good though being evil pertain to ethics, and the being good though doing evil to religion?

Shall we not perhaps be told, on the other hand, that if the sinner suffers an eternal punishment, it is because he does not cease to sin?—­for the damned sin without ceasing.  This, however, is no solution of the problem, which derives all its absurdity from the fact that punishment has been conceived as vindictiveness or vengeance, not as correction, has been conceived after the fashion of barbarous peoples.  And in the same way hell has been conceived as a sort of police institution, necessary in order to put fear into the world.  And the worst of it is that it no longer intimidates, and therefore will have to be shut up.