word, such as quadruped, comprehending these
two species; which men in their situation would no
more be led to form, than a person, who had only seen
one individual of each species, would think of an appellation
to express both, instead of applying a proper name
to each. In consequence of the variety of birds,
it appears that they had a generic name comprehending
all of them, to which it was not unnatural for them
to refer any new animal they met with.”—This
solution is very specious, but when narrowly examined,
will be found to rest on two suppositions not altogether
borne out by evidence, and also to be liable to yield
a conclusion not readily reconcileable with all the
circumstances of the case. In the first place,
it is not proved that these islanders had no generic
word to comprehend the two species of quadrupeds with
which they were acquainted; and the reason given for
their want of it, which, after all, is merely a probable
one, cannot be allowed much force. Its weakness
will appear from the consideration, that men in their
situation, having certainly an idea of number, must,
according to Mr S.’s own principles stated in
the next page, have possessed the power of attending
separately to the things which their senses had presented
to them in a state of union, and have found it necessary
to apply to all of them one common name, or, in other
words, “to have reduced them all to the same
genus.” It is requisite, therefore, for
the validity of Mr S.’s reason, to shew that
these islanders either were not able to distinguish
betwixt their hogs and dogs, or had never numbered
them together, which it is quite impossible to credit.
Even the case of the person who had seen only one
individual of each species, which Mr S. conceives
similar to that we are considering, may be argued against
in the same manner, and besides this, will be found
not analogous. The reason is plain. He may
or may not have been able, from a solitary observation,
to infer that the distinction he noticed betwixt them
was a radical difference, or, in the language of the
schoolmen, was essential: Whereas the islanders,
from the constancy of the differences they observed,
must have been necessitated to form a classification
of the objects, the result of which would be, the
use of one term for the common properties or the resemblance,
and two words for the comprehended individuals.
In the second place, it cannot otherwise be made appear,
that these islanders had a generic name comprehending
the variety of birds with which they were acquainted,
than on such principles of reasoning as we have now
been considering, the proper inference from which,
as we have seen, is destructive of the foundation of
Mr S.’s solution. Here, it may be remarked,
it is somewhat unfortunate that we cannot depend implicitly
on Captain Cook’s account as to the words in
which the islanders conveyed the notions we have been
commenting on; because, as the reader will find at
the end of this section, these people, who, whatever