for merely going home when it did not suit him to
remain longer with the army. Such had been the
uniform practice of their fathers. When a battle
was over, the campaign was, in their opinion, ended;
if it was lost, they sought safety in their mountains—if
won, they returned there to secure their booty.
At other times they had their cattle to look after,
and their harvests to sow or reap, without which their
families would have perished for want. In either
case, there was an end of their services for the time;
and though they were easily enough recalled by the
prospect of fresh adventures and more plunder, yet
the opportunity of success was, in the meantime, lost,
and could not afterwards be recovered. This circumstance
serves to show, even if history had not made us acquainted
with the same fact, that the Highlanders had never
been accustomed to make war with the view of permanent
conquest, but only with the hope of deriving temporary
advantage, or deciding some immediate quarrel.
It also explains the reason why Montrose, with all
his splendid successes, never obtained any secure or
permanent footing in the Lowlands, and why even those
Lowland noblemen and gentlemen, who were inclined
to the royal cause, showed diffidence and reluctance
to join an army of a character so desultory and irregular,
as might lead them at all times to apprehend that
the Highlanders securing themselves by a retreat to
their mountains, would leave whatever Lowlanders might
have joined them to the mercy of an offended and predominant
enemy. The same consideration will also serve
to account for the sudden marches which Montrose was
obliged to undertake, in order to recruit his army
in the mountains, and for the rapid changes of fortune,
by which we often find him obliged to retreat from
before those enemies over whom he had recently been
victorious. If there should be any who read these
tales for any further purpose than that of immediate
amusement, they will find these remarks not unworthy
of their recollection.
It was owing to such causes, the slackness of the
Lowland loyalists and the temporary desertion of his
Highland followers, that Montrose found himself, even
after the decisive victory of Tippermuir, in no condition
to face the second army with which Argyle advanced
upon him from the westward. In this emergency,
supplying by velocity the want of strength, he moved
suddenly from Perth to Dundee, and being refused admission
into that town, fell northward upon Aberdeen, where
he expected to be joined by the Gordons and other
loyalists. But the zeal of these gentlemen was,
for the time, effectually bridled by a large body of
Covenanters, commanded by the Lord Burleigh, and supposed
to amount to three thousand men. These Montrose
boldly attacked with half their number. The battle
was fought under the walls Of the city, and the resolute
valour of Montrose’s followers was again successful
against every disadvantage.