or late. It is part of the heritage of men, this
pain and distress; and he who determines that nothing
shall make him suffer, does but cloak himself in a
profound and chilly selfishness. This cloak may
protect him from pain, it will also separate him from
pleasure. If peace is to be found on earth, or
any joy in life, it cannot be by closing up the gates
of feeling, which admit us to the loftiest and most
vivid part of our existence. Sensation, as we
obtain it through the physical body, affords us all
that induces us to live in that shape. It is
inconceivable that any man would care to take the
trouble of breathing, unless the act brought with
it a sense of satisfaction. So it is with every
deed of every instant of our life. We live because
it is pleasant even to have the sensation of pain.
It is sensation we desire, else we would with one
accord taste of the deep waters of oblivion, and the
human race would become extinct. If this is the
case in the physical life, it is evidently the case
with the life of the emotions,—the imagination,
the sensibilities, all those fine and delicate formations
which, with the marvellous recording mechanism of
the brain, make up the inner or subtile man.
Sensation is that which makes their pleasure; an infinite
series of sensations is life to them. Destroy
the sensation which makes them wish to persevere in
the experiment of living, and there is nothing left.
Therefore the man who attempts to obliterate the sense
of pain, and who proposes to maintain an equal state
whether he is pleased or hurt, strikes at the very
root of life, and destroys the object of his own existence.
And that must apply, so far as our present reasoning
or intuitive powers can show us, to every state, even
to that of the Oriental’s longed-for Nirvana.
This condition can only be one of infinitely subtiler
and more exquisite sensation, if it is a state at
all, and not annihilation; and according to the experience
of life from which we are at present able to judge,
increased subtility of sensation means increased vividness,—as,
for instance, a man of sensibility and imagination
feels more in consequence of the unfaithfulness or
faithfulness of a friend than can a man of even the
grossest physical nature feel through the medium of
the senses. Thus it is clear that the philosopher
who refuses to feel, leaves himself no place to retreat
to, not even the distant and unattainable Nirvanic
goal. He can only deny himself his heritage of
life, which is in other words the right of sensation.
If he chooses to sacrifice that which makes him man,
he must be content with mere idleness of consciousness,—a
condition compared to which the oyster’s is
a life of excitement.