to escape; this was well known.  It seems impossible to resist the conclusion that Patterson should have acceded to the unanimous wish of his rank and file, and followed up his success at Hainesville, by occupying Martinsburg on the 2d, advancing to ’Bunker Hill’ on the 3d, and dispersing the small rebel force known to be there, and celebrating the 4th of July by marching on Winchester, and attacking and reducing that post, as it seems he might easily have done at that time.  This would of course prevent the apprehended junction of Johnston with Beauregard.  The history of the war in the Old Dominion would then have been differently written; Bull Run and its panic would not be a stain upon our national honor, and—­but who can not read the rest?  It is true, Patterson should bear none of the blame of the Bull Run disaster, if he could have done nothing to avoid it; but we have shown that he could have done what was necessary, and that there were reasons existing at the time for taking such a course, of which he should have been cognizant.

The army left Martinsburg for the south, as we have seen, on Monday, July 15th.  The whole division, with trifling exceptions, moved forward, and advanced on that day as far as ‘Bunker Hill,’ ten miles from Martinsburg.  An insignificant rebel force fell back as Patterson advanced, and at ‘Bunker Hill’ the army encamped around the smoking brands of the rebel camp-fires, just deserted.  Here was a small post-town called Mill Creek; and near by, the high ridge called ’Bunker Hill’ formed another fine natural position for defence; but the rebels were not disposed to defend it.  Patterson lay here two days, within twelve miles of the rebel strong-hold at Winchester, the pickets of the two armies watching each other by night and day.  On the 17th the Federal army was astir before daylight, and an advance to the south was commenced.  But before the rear-guard filed down from ‘Bunker Hill’ to the turnpike, a counter-march was ordered; and the whole division proceeded twelve miles to the east, leaving Winchester on their flank, and occupying Charlestown, in Jefferson County.  What could have pleased Johnston better?  What wonder that he should take the opportunity, as soon as satisfied that this flank movement was not intended to operate against him, to leave his fortifications at Winchester in charge of a small force, and rush to reinforce Beauregard?  And is it not more than remarkable that Patterson, after occupying Charlestown for four days, should fall back to Harper’s Ferry on the very day when his foe had effected his ruse de guerre, and was actually turning the tide of battle at Bull Run?