question,’ which shall be full and satisfactory, though the length of time involved be but one hundred days.  But it is different with Gen. Patterson.  It is true that his loyalty is disputed, and in this question may be involved many complicated issues; but the question of the general result of his three months’ campaign in Virginia admits but one answer;—­it was a failure.  And it is an exception to the general rule that we can, within a few months after his campaign closed, see and understand exactly why and how he failed.

It is not proposed in this article to discuss the loyalty of Gen. Patterson, or to take sides with either those who claim for him a patriot’s laurels or those who would have him suffer a traitor’s fate.  We shall ignore this question entirely, simply examining the acts of his last campaign, with reference to his capability and efficiency, the nature and effects of his policy, and the reasons of his failure.  We propose to try him in the same manner and by the same standard as we would if his loyalty had never been questioned.

The early morning of the 12th day of June, 1861, found the writer a volunteer soldier of less than two months’ experience in camp, just arrived with his regiment, from the distant Badger State, at Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, where it was to join Patterson’s division of the Federal army.  For the next two months ensuing, the writer possessed all the facilities attainable to a private in the ranks for observing the progress of events in that division of the army, judging as to the propriety or necessity of the various movements, and forming opinions as to whether Patterson was using to the best advantage the military means within his control.  These facilities were not many, it is true; but the public opinion of the North demanded certain actions from the general, and the writer, though but a private, could judge as to whether those demands of the loyal North were reasonable, and as to whether Patterson could accomplish what was required, if he chose.  He was expected to do something; it did not matter in what particular manner; but it was deemed essential that he should in some way hold Johnston in check, and prevent his junction with the main rebel force at Manassas.  And this was precisely what Patterson did not do.  Bull Run was fought and lost, and the very result attained which Patterson was expected to prevent.  Could it have been prevented?

It is fashionable in these days to set up the cry of inefficiency when a general does not do everything that public opinion requires.  The Americans are proverbially a fault-finding people; and it will of course be as easy to make out an ex parte case against Gen. Patterson as against our other generals.  We propose, nevertheless, at the risk of being unfashionable, to discuss candidly these expectations of the American people which were not realized, together with the actual doings of the unsuccessful general.  We deem it susceptible of logical proof that Patterson might and should have prevented Johnston’s junction with Beauregard.