Next in importance to the right division of Imperial and local powers is a correct understanding of the relation borne by the executive of an autonomous country to the mother country.  In every part of the British Empire which enjoys home rule the legislature consists of the Queen and the two local legislative bodies.  The administrative power resides in the Queen alone.  The Queen has the appointment of all the officers of the government; money bills can be introduced into the legislature only with the consent of the Queen.  The initiative power of taxation then is vested in the Queen, the executive head, in practice represented by the Governor.  But such a power of initiation is of course useless unless the legislative body is willing to support the executive, and grants it the necessary funds for carrying on the government.  What, then, is the contrivance by which the governmental machine is prevented from being stopped by a difference between the executive and legislative authorities?  It is the same in the mother country, and in every British home-rule country, with this difference only—­that beyond the limits of the mother country the Queen is represented by a governor to whom are delegated such a measure of powers as is necessary for the supreme head of a local self-governing community.  The contrivance is this in the mother country:—­the Queen acts upon the advice of a cabinet council; in home-rule dependencies the Governor acts on the advice of a local council.  If this cabinet council in the mother country, or local council in a dependency, ceases to command a majority in the popular legislative body, it resigns, and the Governor is obliged to select a council which, by commanding such a majority, can obtain the supplies necessary to carry on the government.  The consequence then is, that in a home-rule community, if a serious difficulty arises between the legislative and executive authority, the head of the executive, the governor, refers the ultimate decision of the question to the general body of electors by dissolving the popular legislative body.  It has been urged in the discussion on the Irish Government Bill that the powers of the executive in relation to the legislative body ought to be expressed in the Bill itself; but it is clear to anybody acquainted with the rudiments of legislation that the details of such a system (in other words, the mode in which a governor ought to act under the endless variety of circumstances which may occur in governing a dependency) never have been and never can be expressed in an Act of Parliament.  But how little difficulty this absence of definition has caused may be judged from the fact that neither in England nor in any of her home-rule dependencies has any vital collision arisen between the executive and legislative authorities, and that all the home-rule colonies have managed to surmount the obstacles which the opponents of Home Rule argued would be fatal to their existence.  The main principles have now been stated on which the Irish Government Bill is framed, and it remains to give a summary of the provisions of the Bill, the objects and bearing of which will be readily understood from the foregoing observations.  The first clause provides that—­