Of these two courses the Cabinet chose the latter, those of its members whom we must suppose, from the language they now hold, to have then hesitated, either stifling their fears or not apprehending the consequences of their boldness.  It might have been expected, and indeed was generally expected, that the Tory party would refuse to follow.  They talked largely about the danger of an extended Irish suffrage, and pointed out that it would be a weapon in the hands of disloyalty.  But when the moment for resistance came, they swerved, and never divided in either House against the application of the Bill to Ireland.  They might have failed to defeat the measure; but they would have immensely strengthened their position, logically and morally, had they given effect by their votes to the sentiments they were known to entertain, and which not a few Liberals shared.

The effect of this uncontested grant to Ireland of a suffrage practically universal was immense upon our minds, and the longer we reflected on it the more significant did it become.  It meant to us that the old methods were abandoned, and, as we supposed, for ever.  We had deliberately given the Home Rule party arms against English control far more powerful than they previously possessed.  We had deliberately asserted our faith in the Irish people.  Impossible after this to fall back on Coercion Bills.  Impossible to refuse any request compatible with the general safety of the United Kingdom, which Ireland as a nation might prefer.  Impossible to establish that system of Crown Colony Government which we had come to perceive was the only real and solid alternative to self-government.  To those of us who had been feeling that the Irish difficulty was much the greatest of all England’s difficulties, this stood out beyond the agitation of the autumn and the compromise of the winter as the great political event of 1884.[4]

Although this sketch is in the main a record of Parliamentary opinion, I ought not to pass over the influence which the study of their constituents’ ideas exerted upon members for the larger towns.  We found the vast bulk of our supporters—­English supporters, for after 1882 it was understood that the Irish voters were our enemies—­sympathetic with the Irish people.  They knew and thought little about Home Rule, believing that their member understood that question better than they did, and willing, so long as he was sound on English issues, to trust him.  But they pitied Irish tenants, and condemned Irish landlords.  Though they acquiesced in a Coercion Bill when proposed by a Liberal Cabinet, because they concluded that nothing less than necessity would lead such a Cabinet to propose one, they so much disliked any exceptional or repressive legislation that it was plain they would not long tolerate it.  Any popular leader denouncing coercion was certain to have the sentiment of the English masses with him, while as to suspending Irish representation or carrying