Again, how are we to get a strong centralized administration in the face of a powerful and hostile parliamentary representation?  It is very easy to talk of the benefits that might have been conferred on Ireland by such humanity and justice as was practised by Turgot in his administration of the Generality of Limoges.  But Turgot was not confronted by eighty-six Limousin members of an active sovereign body, all interested in making his work difficult, and trusted by a large proportion of the people of the province with that as their express commission.  It is possible to have an honest centralized administration of great strength and activity in India, but there is no Parliament in India.  If India, or any province of it, ever gets representative government and our parliamentary system, from that hour, if there be any considerable section of Indian feeling averse from European rule, the present administrative system will be paralyzed, as the preliminary to being revolutionized.  It is conceivable, if any one chooses to think so, that a body of impartial officials could manage the national business in Ireland much better without the guidance of public opinion and common sentiment than with it.  But if you intend to govern the country as you think best—­and that is the plain and practical English of centralized administration—­why ask the country to send a hundred men to the great tribunal of supervision to inform you how it would like to be governed?  The Executive cannot set them aside as if they were a hundred dummies; in refusing to be guided, it cannot escape being harassed, by them.  You may amend procedure, but that is no answer, unless you amend the Irish members out of voice and vote.  They will still count.  You cannot gag and muzzle them effectually, and if you could, they would still be there, and their presence would still make itself incessantly felt.  Partly from a natural desire to lessen the common difficulties of government, and partly from a consciousness, due to the prevailing state of the modern political atmosphere, that there is something wrong in this total alienation of an Executive from the possessors of parliamentary power, the officials will incessantly be tempted to make tacks out of their own course; and thus they lose the coherency and continuity of absolutism without gaining the pliant strength of popular government.  This is not a presumption of what would be likely to happen, but an account of what does happen, and what justified Mr. Disraeli in adding a weak Executive to the alien Church and the absentee aristocracy, as the three great curses of Ireland.  Nothing has occurred since 1844 to render the Executive stronger, but much to the contrary.  There is, and there can be, no weaker or less effective Government in the world than a highly centralized system working alongside of a bitterly inimical popular representation.  I say nothing of the effect of the fluctuations of English parties on Irish administration.  I say nothing