adapted to whet the appetite of the Irish for nationality,
without supplying them with any portion of the real
article. It would supply no basis on which a system
of agrarian reform could be founded, as it would be
impossible to leave the determination of a local question,
which is a unit in its dangers and its difficulties,
to four different Legislatures; above all, the hinge
on which the question turns—the sufficiency
of the security for the British taxpayer—could
not be afforded by provincial resources. Indeed,
no alternative for the Land Bill of 1886 has been suggested
which does not err in one of the following points:
either it pledges English credit on insufficient security,
or it requires the landowners to accept Irish debentures
or some form of Irish paper money at par; in other
words, it makes English taxes a fund for relieving
Irish landlords, or else it compels the Irish landowner,
if he sells at all, to sell at an inadequate price.
Before parting with Canada, it may be worth while
noticing that another, and more feasible, alternative
is to imitate more closely the Canadian Constitution,
and to vest the central or Dominion powers in a central
Legislature in Dublin, parcelling out the provincial
powers, as they have been called, amongst several provincial
Legislatures. This scheme might be made available
as a means of protecting Ulster from the supposed
danger of undue interference from the Central Government,
and for making, possibly, other diversities in the
local administration of various parts of Ireland in
order to meet special local exigencies.
A leading writer among the dissentient Liberals has
intimated that one of two forms of representative
colonial government might be imposed on Ireland—either
the form in which the executive is conducted by colonial
officials, or the form of the great irresponsible colonies.
The first of these forms is open to the objection,
that it perpetuates those struggles between English
executive measures and Irish opinion which has made
Ireland for centuries ungovernable, and led to the
establishment of the union and destruction of Irish
independence in 1800; the second proposal would destroy
the fiscal unity of the empire—leave the
agrarian feud unextinguished, and aggravate the objections
which have been urged against the Home Rule Bill of
1886. A question still remains, in relation to
the form of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which
would not have deserved attention but for the prominence
given to it in some of the discussions upon the subject.
The Bill of 1886 provides “that the Legislature
may make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of Ireland,” but subjects their power to numerous
exceptions and restrictions. The Act establishing
the Dominion of Canada enumerates various matters
in respect of which the Legislature of Canada is to
have exclusive power, but prefaces the enumeration
with a clause “that the Dominion Legislature
may make laws for the peace, order, and good government