“Do not risk battle.  Rene is poor.  If there are no immediate engagements, his mercenaries will abandon him for lack of pay.  Raise the siege and depart for Flanders and Luxemburg.  The army can rest and be increased.  Then at the approach of spring it will be easy to fall upon Rene deprived of his troops.”

Charles was absolutely deaf to these arguments.  He was determined on facing the issue at once.  Leaving a small force to sustain the siege, he ordered the camp to be broken on the evening of the 4th and a movement made towards St.-Nicolas.  He selected a ground favourable for the manipulation of a large body, and placed his artillery on a plateau situated between Jarville and Neuville.  It was not a good position, being hedged in on the right and in front by woods which could conceal the movements of a foe without impeding them.  Only one way of retreat was open—­towards Metz, whose bishop was Charles’s last ally.  But to reach Metz, it was necessary to cross several small streams and deceptive marshes, half frozen as they were, besides the river Meurthe, a serious obstacle with the garrison of Nancy on the flank.  In short, there was ample reason to dread surprise, while in case of defeat a terrible catastrophe was more than possible.  Curiously, the precise kind of difficulties which beset the field of Morat were repeated here—­proof that Charles had not the qualities of a general who could learn by experience.[16]

The exact force at his disposal on this occasion has been variously estimated.  Considering the ravages of the sanguinary skirmishes during the siege, and of the cold, it is probable that the actual combatants did not number more than ten thousand, all told.  And only half of these were of any value—­two thousand men under Galeotto, and three thousand Burgundians commanded by Charles and his immediate lieutenants.  The remainder were unreliable mercenaries and the still more unreliable troops of Campobasso already pledged to the foe.  La Marche estimates Rene’s force at twelve thousand and adds:  “The Duke of Burgundy was far behind, for, on my conscience, he had not two thousand fighting men."[17]

The allies adopted a plan of battle proposed by a Lorrainer, Vautrin Wuisse.  The first manoeuvre was to divert the foe and turn him towards the woods, and then to attack his centre, which would at the same time be pressed at the front by the Lorraine forces, headed by Rene himself.  The plan succeeded in every point.  Surprised that they dared take the offensive, Charles was alert to the harsh cries of the “bull” of Uri and the “cow” of Unterwalden, which were heard across the woods.  A sudden presentiment saddened him.  Putting on his helmet, he accidentally knocked off the lion bearing the legend Hoc est signum Dei.  He replaced it and plunged into the melee.

The onslaught was terrific.  Galeotto’s troops and the duke’s were the only ones to make sturdy resistance.  The right wing of the army gave way under the fierce assault of the Swiss.  The cry, “Sauve qui pent!” raised possibly by Campobasso’s traitors, produced a terrible rout.  Three quarters of the troops were in flight, while the duke still fought on with superhuman ferocity.