“Once [says Commines][15] I was present when the Seigneur d’Urse [envoy from the Duke of Guienne] was talking in this wise and urging the duke to mobilise his forces with all diligence.  The duke called me to a window and said, ’Here is the Seigneur d’Urse urging me to make my army as big as possible, and tells me that we would do well for the realm.  Do you think that I should wage a war of benefit if I should lead my troops thither?’ Smiling I answered that I thought not and he uttered these words:  ’I love the welfare of France more than Mons. d’ Urse imagines, for instead of the one king that there is I would fain see six.’”

The animus of this expression is clear.  It implies a wish to see the duke’s friends, the French nobles, exalted, Burgundy at the head, until the titular monarch had no more power than half a dozen of his peers.  Yet Commines states in unequivocal terms that Charles’s next moves were to disregard his friendship for the peers, to discard their alliance, and to sign a treaty with Louis whose terms were wholly to his own advantage and implied complete desertion of the allied interest.

“This peace did the Duke of Burgundy swear and I was present[16] and to it swore the Seigneur de Craon and the Chancellor of France[17] in behalf of the king.  When they departed they advised the duke not to disband his army but to increase it, so that the king their master might be the more inclined to cede promptly the two places mentioned above.  They took with them Simon de Quingey to witness the king’s oath and confirmation of his ambassadors’ work.  The king delayed this confirmation for several days.  Meanwhile occurred the death of his brother, the Duke of Guienne ... shortly afterwards the said Simon returned, dismissed by the king with very meagre phrases and without any oath being taken.  The duke felt mocked and insulted by this treatment and was very indignant about it."[18]

This story involves so serious a charge against Charles of Burgundy that the fact of his setting his signature to the treaty has been indignantly denied.  Certain authorities impugn the historian’s truthfulness rather than accept the duke’s betrayal of his friends.  It is true that only a few months later than this negotiation, Commines himself forsook the duke’s service for the king’s, a change of base that might well throw suspicion on his estimate of his deserted master.

Yet it must be remembered that he does not gloss over Louis’s actions, even though he had an admiration for the success of his political methods, methods which Commines believed to be essential in dealing with national affairs.  In many respects he gives more credit to the duke than to the king even while he prefers the cleverer chief.  That there is no documentary evidence of such a treaty is mere negative evidence and of little importance.